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I test the hypothesis that investors evaluate stocks based on the prospect theory value of the distribution of past returns.
Because some investors tilt towards stocks with high prospect theory value, these stocks become overvalued and earn low
subsequent returns. During bubbles this effect should be stronger, due to rising limits to arbitrage and increased participation
of individual investors. I do not find strong support for this prediction in the cross section of returns in U.S. stock markets. In
contrast to other variables know to explain returns however, prospect theory value does not lose its predictive power during
bubbles. Investors with prospect theory preferences seem to choose stocks whose returns optimally combine low standard
deviation with high skewness.
Keywords: Prospect Theory; bubbles; limits to arbitrage; individual investors.
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
The decision whether to buy or sell a stock is risky. In
order to understand the buying and selling behaviour in the
stock market it is therefore important to investigate how in-
vestors make risky choices. In other words, how do investors
evaluate a given stock and how can this be integrated into
pricing models? In the past century, many researchers mod-
elled investor’s choices via expected utility. They assumed
that investors maximize their expected utility, which is the
sum of the utility of each outcome weighted by its probabil-
ity. It relies on certain assumptions formalized by Neumann
(1944). Expected utility has been a useful tool for research in
investor behaviour and asset pricing. Nonetheless, the pric-
ing models based on its assumptions do not explain stock
prices with complete precision. Several anomalies seem to
persist in the stock market, despite multi-factor pricing mod-
els. For example, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find that
stocks that performed well during the past year subsequently
outperform stock that did poorly during the past year. This
effect is generally called momentum. De Bondt and Thaler
(1985) report on long-term reversal: a stock’s returns over
the last two to five years on average negatively predict the
subsequent return. Similarly, there is a short-term reversal in
stock returns i.e. the return of the last month negatively pre-
dicts the following return, discovered by Lehmann (1990).
More recently, Ang et al. (2006) find that the volatility of
idiosyncratic returns has a negative effect on returns, while
Novy-Marx (2013) shows how measures of firm profitabil-
ity have a positive effect on returns, with a predictive power
comparable to that of the book-to-market ratio. In light of
these return patterns which are hard to make sense of using
classical measures of risk and return, some researchers have
focused on behavioural explanations. Maybe it is wrong to
assume that investors make rational investment choices in
the stock market. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tver-
sky and Kahnemann (1992) offer an alternative model of
preferences and choice under risk: prospect theory. They
specifically develop prospect theory to address violations of
the underlying axioms of expected utility. Unlike expected
utility, prospect theory is a descriptive model built on experi-
mental evidence. In order to test the accuracy of this theory,
it is necessary to apply it in real world settings. Do investors
in the stock market behave according to prospect theory?
Barberis et al. (2016) derive testable predictions of prospect
theory for average returns in the stock market. I closely fol-
low their work and first test their prediction in my sample.
However, I argue that the magnitude of the predicted effect
is time-varying; it should be different for bubble and non-
bubble periods. But first I want to turn to prospect theory
and the original prediction made by Barberis et al. (2016).
1.2. Approach
Prospect theory has not been tested in the stock market
very often, maybe because there are some specifications that
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are hard to translate into empirical work. These specification
issues come down to seemingly simple questions that arise
when thinking about the choice making process in prospect
theory. Generally, individuals evaluate a risky choice based
on a certain set of outcomes and associated probabilities. Be-
fore getting to the evaluation though, individuals first need
to form a representation of the risky choice they are facing.
This representation should be formulated in terms of gains
and losses, since prospect theory is defined over gains and
losses and not absolute wealth. In contrast to the valuation
process of a given set of gains and losses, there is no formal
description of the representation process in prospect theory.
In a short review I therefore give an overview of the research
concerning two related questions: (1) What is the reference
point investors use to measure gains and losses?, and (2)
Where do investors get the information on returns and how
could the presentation form influence their representation of
stock returns?. A debate in the research on reference points
is whether individuals look to the status quo, where the refer-
ence point is initial wealth, or the recently held expectations
about an outcome to determine gains and losses. Although a
reference point based on expectations might make more intu-
itive sense, I find research supporting both views. Regarding
the sources of information and the impact of presentation
form on the perceived return, it becomes clear that individu-
als could form representations that do not reflect the actually
observed information. Nolte and Schneider (2018) for ex-
ample find that the shape of price paths influences perceived
attractiveness of an investment, even keeping the underlying
return distribution equal. Accounting for these phenomena
and integrating them into an empirical framework indeed is
an issue when applying prospect theory. Once the process of
representation is finished, Tversky and Kahnemann (1992)
provide detailed formulae and parameter estimates to calcu-
late the associated utility i.e. the prospect theory value.
My first assumption is that investors evaluate the attrac-
tiveness of a stock based on its returns in the past. From theo-
retical point of view looking at past returns is not ideal, since
a stock’s value should depend on future cash flows of the un-
derlying firm, not to mention the anomalies where past re-
turns negatively predict future returns. But in practice many
investors might confront issues concerning the availability of
resources, be it in the form of time, knowledge or data. Tak-
ing aside professional investors, which are not the investor
group central to the analysis, the assumption of past return
distributions as basis for the subsequent evaluation seems
reasonable. Therefore I compute the prospect theory value
for each stock using its past return distribution.
For the development of predictions I rely on the model
of asset prices by Barberis et al. (2016). In their model,
two types of investors populate the market. Rational in-
vestors construct the tangency portfolio that is based on the
mean-variance framework of Markowitz (1952). Individual
investors have a preference for stocks with high prospect the-
ory value and do not like stocks with low prospect theory
value. They therefore adjust the tangency portfolio positively
(negatively) for high (low) prospect theory value stocks. This
setup results in the model’s prediction that stocks with high
prospect theory value will earn low subsequent returns. By
introducing a small extension to this model, I make a sec-
ond prediction that the subsequent returns on stocks with
high prospect theory value will be lower during bubble peri-
ods compared to non-bubble periods. The argument for the
stronger effect during bubbles is twofold.
The first part of the argument is that the limits to arbi-
trage for rational investors should rise, conceding individual
investors more influence on prices. There are several papers
supporting this view. The most important concept is delayed
arbitrage, introduced by Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003).
They show that rational investors i.e. arbitrageurs do not
necessarily have interest in correcting mispricing during bub-
bles, because they try to “ride” the bubble and exit right be-
fore it collapses. In addition, Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)
find that overconfident investors with heterogeneous beliefs
about fundamental value can buy stocks exceeding their own
valuation. Finally, a combination of these heterogeneous be-
liefs about fundamental value and the workings of the mar-
ket for borrowing stock reported by D’Avolio (2002) lead to
higher short selling costs during bubbles. The second part
of the argument is that the fraction of individual investors
increases during bubbles, which leads to a stronger overval-
uation of high prospect theory value stocks and lower subse-
quent returns. Barber and Odean (2008) find that individual
investor often buy stocks that grab their attention. Therefore
the media coverage of a bubble or stock market rally could in-
centivise new irrational investor to buy the set of stocks that
drive the bubble.
In order to test the original prediction by Barberis et al.
(2016) and my own prediction it is necessary to define the ex-
act format of past return distribution and what constitutes a
bubble in stock markets. Coming back to the debate over ref-
erence points for gains and losses, it is best to test three differ-
ent benchmarks to measure past returns against: raw returns
and returns in excess of both the risk-free rate and the mar-
ket. While raw returns relate to initial wealth, market returns
could be a proxy for investor’s return expectations. The infor-
mation source should determine the frequency and the look
back window for the returns in the distribution. The sample I
use could be loosely split in half pre-internet and half internet
era. In the first half it is reasonable to adopt the convention
that investors use investment booklets as the main informa-
tion source1. These booklets often show monthly price charts
with a lookback period of three to five years. Past return dis-
tribution therefore refers to monthly returns over the past five
years in my framework. The important change in the internet
era is the sheer amount of information available, although
price charts still seem to be prominent2. Hence I decide not
to switch the definition of return distributions, although it
is an interesting thought. Regarding the definition of bub-
bles I rely on a “rational bubble” model and an economet-
ric method developed in a series of papers by Phillips et al.
1See Alexander et al., 1998, Table 3, p.307.
2See Glaser et al., 2019, Appendix A Table 1, p.7-8.
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(2015a,b) and Phillips et al. (2011). They use right-tailed
unit root tests to infer explosive price behaviour by working
with the stochastic processes of the underlying dividends and
fundamentals.
The empirical analysis begins with the detection and time
stamping of bubbles in the S&P 500, which is assumed to be
a good proxy for U.S. stock markets in general. I detect the
existence of a bubble and the time stamping process results
in two phases of explosive prices, from February to August
1987 and from December 1995 to September 2000. These
time periods coincide with the bubble leading up to Black
Monday and the tech bubble at the end of the last century.
The main empirical test consists of Fama and MacBeth (1973,
just Fama-MacBeth hereafter) regressions, in order to allow
good comparability of my results with the analysis of Barberis
et al. (2016). First, the prospect theory value is computed for
every month using a stock’s returns in excess of the market
over the past five years. Then the prospect theory value, to-
gether with control variables known to predict returns, serves
as the independent variable in a monthly regression on re-
turns. The result of the Fama-MacBeth test is the time-series
average of these cross-sectional regressions. I find support
for the original prediction that stocks with high prospect the-
ory value earn low returns in U.S. stock markets. In order to
test whether this effect is different during bubbles, the sam-
ple is split into two sub periods. As a result I cannot con-
firm that high prospect theory value stocks earn lower returns
during bubbles compared to non-bubble periods. Depending
on the number of control variables used, the prospect theory
value has higher predictive power for returns during bubbles.
But the most sophisticated model shows that the effect of the
prospect theory value is very similar to non-bubble periods.
Portfolio sorts on the prospect theory value point into the
same direction. On the surface, the low minus high prospect
theory value portfolio earns higher abnormal returns during
bubbles. Conducting robustness tests shows that the returns
to this strategy remain high even when using different re-
turns, return distribution construction windows, subsamples
or excluding low price stocks. However, the returns to the
low minus high portfolio are less robust during bubbles, be-
cause the returns in the high prospect theory value deciles
are not significantly different from zero.
To test the plausibility of the argument that limits to ar-
bitrage are related to the relationship between returns and
prospect theory value, I analyse the interaction of prospect
theory value with several proxies for the limits to arbitrage.
These tests show that the negative effect of prospect theory
value on returns is generally stronger for stocks experiencing
higher limits to arbitrage. On the other hand they show that
rising limits to arbitrage have no impact on the predictive
power of the prospect theory value during bubbles. This is at
least true for the different proxies for the limits to arbitrage
I employ.
In the later part of the paper I take a closer look into the
mechanism behind the predictive power of the prospect the-
ory value for returns. Each Fama-MacBeth regression turns
off two components of prospect theory by setting their pa-
rameters to one. In addition, the sample is split into bubble
and non-bubble periods once again. Loss aversion is found to
be the most significant predictor of returns by itself. This indi-
cates that investors with prospect theory preferences should
prefer stocks with low standard deviation. In a relevance hi-
erarchy probability weighting comes in second. The prospect
theory variable constructed with probability weighting only
is not a significant predictor of returns, but in conjunction
with loss aversion it contributes positively to the significance.
Since probability weighting seems to play at least some role,
investors under prospect theory should also prefer skewness.
Sorting stocks into deciles based on prospect theory value
provides support for these findings. The results indicate that
investors with prospect theory preferences like stocks that op-
timally trade of low standard deviation and high skewness.
This study mainly contributes to the work of Barberis
et al. (2016) and shows that the relationship between the
prospect theory value and returns is strong and predicts re-
turns almost equally well during bubbles and non-bubble pe-
riods. The analysis of the power of known return predictors
also shows that behavioural explanations, like prospect the-
ory, can be valuable in research on asset pricing. In addition,
my paper provides further evidence on the reliability of the
tests for explosive price behaviour developed by Phillips et al.
(2015a). The paper is organized as follows. In chapter 2
prospect theory and the construction of return distributions
is presented. This entails the presentation and discussion of
each component relevant to prospect theory. Subsequently
chapter 3 introduces the model of asset price by Barberis et al.
(2016). There I develop a small extension to the model and
form the hypothesis. Chapter 4 presents the evidence back-
ing the hypothesis, together with an overview of the research
on the limits to arbitrage. Chapter 5 consists of a discussion
of the history of bubbles and different measurement models
of explosive behaviour in prices. In addition, it presents the
model for detection and time stamping of bubbles by Phillips
et al. (2015a) leading up to the application of the method
to the time series of the S&P 500. In chapter 6, I analyse
the results from several empirical tests designed to provide
evidence for my hypothesis. This part of the paper starts off
with the data description and summary statistics and then
continues over to portfolio sorts and the Fama-MacBeth re-
gressions designed to be the central empirical test. In later
parts of chapter 6 I look more closely into the limits to arbi-
trage argument and the mechanism behind prospect theory.
In the final chapter of the paper I summarize the results and
main conclusion and give a direction for future research in
related areas.
2. Prospect theory
2.1. Representation and valuation
In the framework of this study, investors evaluate stocks
in a two-step process. The first step is the preliminary anal-
ysis of the presented stock, in which some representation of
outcomes is formed. How do investors mentally represent a
M. Piehler / Junior Management Science 5(3) (2020) 262-294 265
stock? Which sources do they use as a basis for the represen-
tation? In order to answer these questions in the context of
prospect theory and the stock market, it is important to de-
fine what gains and losses are in the stock market, while also
keeping in mind the information sources used by investors.
I therefore present a short overview of the related research
in section 2.3. But first it is useful to take a closer look at
the second step, valuation, during which investors evaluate
the representation of the stock they formed earlier. For this
part of the process, Tversky and Kahnemann (1992) provide
a formal framework and parameter estimates.
2.2. Valuation
2.2.1. Valuation methodology
Based on a critique of the expected utility framework,
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) develop a descriptive model
of decision making under risk. They analyse the preferred
choices of individuals confronted with a set of outcomes and
associated probabilities. Because these “prospects” are re-
stricted to two non-zero outcomes, the applicability of the
original version of prospect theory is limited. Further, indi-
viduals sometimes choose dominated prospects. Tversky and
Kahnemann (1992) address these problems in their cumula-
tive formulation of prospect theory. I first present the func-
tional form of this theory and then discuss the components
and their implications for decision making under risk.
Let X be a set of uncertain outcomes x , where all out-
comes except one neutral outcome are gains or losses. The
function that assigns each uncertain outcome a probability p
is the prospect to be considered by the individual:
(x−m, p−m; x−m+1, p−m+1; . . . ; x−1, p−1;
x0, p0; x1, p1; . . . ; xn, pn).
(1)
The subscripts −m and n stand for the most negative and
most positive outcome, respectively. Before individuals de-




w (pi + · · ·+ pn)−w (pi+1 + · · ·+ pn)
w (p−m + · · ·+ pi)−w (p−m + · · ·+ pi−1)
for
0≤ i ≤ n
−m≤ i < 0 , (2)
according to the weighting functions
w+(p) = pγ/ (pγ + (1− p)γ)1/γ , w−(p)
= pδ/
 




As indicated by the parameters γ and δ the weighting
function is different for gains and losses. The same is true
for the value function:
v(x) =
§
xα if x ≥ 0
−λ(−x)α if x < 0 , (4)





πi v (x i) . (5)
Put into words, an individual analyses each pair of out-
come and probability according to (2)-(4) and values the
prospect as a sum of these parts. I now turn to discuss
essential components of prospect theory, namely probabil-
ity weighting, reference dependence, diminishing sensitivity
and loss aversion.
2.2.2. Components of prospect theory and related concepts
Probability weighting
Probability weighting refers to the transformation of proba-
bilities into decision weights. These weights are a represen-
tation of the perceived impact an outcome has on the evalu-
ation of the prospect. As a consequence decision weights do
not equal the objective probability of an outcome. An inter-
esting case in probability weighting is individuals’ preference
for lotteries and insurance. Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
describe two gambles that illustrate these preferences. In the
first gamble, the options are a gain of 5000 with a 0.001
chance or a gain of 5 with certainty. In the second gam-
ble, the options are a loss of 5000 with a 0.001 chance or
a loss of 5 with certainty. Notice that the expected value of
the options in both gambles is identical. The majority of re-
spondents prefer the very unlikely gain of 5000 in the first
gamble, while choosing the certain loss of 5 in the second
gamble. These choices show that individuals overweight very
small probabilities, causing them to prefer lottery-like out-
comes in the domain of gains and insurance in the domain of
losses. The weighting function that transforms probabilities
into decision weights in prospect theory accounts for this by
its inverse s-shaped slope. Figure 1 plots the weighting func-
tions for γ=0.61 and δ=0.69, as estimated by Tversky and
Kahnemann (1992). In the original version the probabilities
used as input to the weighting function are exact, individ-
ual probabilities. As Quiggin (1982) shows, the application
of decision weights to exact probabilities can lead to viola-
tions of dominance. He suggests using the entire cumulative
distribution of probabilities instead. In cumulative prospect
theory, the formulation of decision weights is in accordance
with this approach. For any positive outcome, the decision
weight is the difference between the probabilities of “the out-
come is at least as good as x i” and “the outcome is strictly
better than x i”, the weighting function applied to both. For
any negative outcome, the decision weight is the difference
between the probabilities derived from “the outcome is at
least as bad as x i” and “the outcome is strictly worse than
x i”, again, the weighting function applied to both. These
types of decision weights capture the contribution of a sin-
gle outcome in context of the entire probability distribution.
Consequently the overweighting of small probabilities carries
over into an overweighting of the tails of any distribution in
cumulative prospect theory.
Reference dependence
Reference dependence implies that individuals evaluate the
attractiveness of an outcome based on gains and losses in re-
lation to a reference point. In expected utility there is no
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Figure 1: The weighting function (Based on Tversky and Kahnemann (1992), p.313).
Graphic illustration of the probability weighting function in prospect theory for γ=0.61 (solid line) and δ=0.69 (dashed line).
difference to whether the outcome of a gamble represents
a relative increase or decrease in wealth to the individual.
Only the final wealth is considered. Intuitively though, the
same final wealth can feel different depending on how it was
reached, through a gain or a loss. In accordance with this
rationale Kahneman and Tversky (1979) find experimental
evidence that individuals’ choices are dependent on their ref-
erence point. It is not clear though, what constitutes such a
point. Köszegi, B. and Rabin, M. (2006) for example assume
that the reference point is the individual’s recently held ex-
pectations about an outcome.
Diminishing sensitivity
The principle of diminishing sensitivity determines the shape
of the value function. The value function in prospect the-
ory is concave for gains and convex for losses, as seen in
figure 2. This shape is inspired by the proposition that the
marginal value of gains and losses decrease with their mag-
nitude. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) motivate this proposi-
tion through following problems posed to individuals in their
experiments. The options in the first problem are a gain of
6000 with probability 0.25 or gains of 4000 and 2000, each
with probability 0.25. The majority of respondents choose
option two, implying that the value of the separate gains
is larger than the value of the single gain, although both
options offer a reward of 6000 in total. Since apparently
v(6000)< v(4000)+ v(2000), the marginal value of smaller
gains must be larger and the function for gains convex. The
second problem has the same structure, only in the domain of
losses, and in turn supports the convexity of the value func-
tion for losses. Tversky and Kahnemann (1992) estimate a
median value of 0.88 for α in equation (4), in accordance
with moderate levels of diminishing sensitivity.
Loss aversion
Loss aversion is the tendency of individuals to perceive losses
stronger than gains of the same size. Therefore the value
function for losses is steeper than for gains. This produces a
kink at the origin. It illustrates how people are very reluctant
to accept gambles with equal probabilities and exactly oppo-
site outcomes. For example, a coin toss with a payment of
50 or -50 seems unattractive, because the individual is much
more sensitive to the potential loss. In the value function in
(4) the parameter λ determines the degree of loss aversion.
Tversky and Kahnemann (1992) estimate a median value of
2.25 for λ, finding evidence of strong loss aversion in individ-
uals’ decisions under risk. Loss aversion is a widely accepted
concept not only in neuroscience research3, but also specif-
ically in the finance literature. Benartzi and Thaler (1995),
for example, use investor’s loss aversion as a part of their ex-
planation of the equity premium puzzle.
Narrow framing
One further concept in the analysis of choices under risk, not
originally integrated in prospect theory, is sometimes applied
together with prospect theory: narrow framing. Tversky and
Kahnemann (1981) first describe the effect of “decision fram-
ing” on the preferences of test subjects. Decision framing
refers to how individuals conceive a prospect i.e. how they
perceive the choices they are presented with. The prefer-
3See Tom et al., 2007, for a study on the neural basis of loss aversion.
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Figure 2: The value function (Based on Tversky and Kahnemann (1992), p.311).
Graphic illustration of the value function in Prospect Theory for α=0.5, λ=2.5 (solid line) and α=0.88, λ=2.25 (dashed line).The blue dashed line is the
parameter specification used in the main analysis of this paper.
ences observed depend on the framing of the choice. Narrow
framing is a specific way of framing choices: Each choice is
viewed separately from other choices that might have to be
made. This means that the current choice is isolated from
other choices. Rabin, M. and Weizsäcker, G. (2009) replicate
the experimental results of Tversky and Kahnemann (1981)
and find in a survey that 89 percent of respondents engaged
in narrow framing. The concept of narrow framing is also
applicable in the stock market. Some investors might not
track the performance of their overall portfolio, but rather the
gains and losses of individual stock in the portfolio. Kumar
and Lim (2008) use trade clustering as a proxy for narrow
framing and show that investors engaging in narrow fram-
ing exhibit stronger disposition effects4. If investors track
gains and losses on the individual stock level, they should in-
deed be more prone to the disposition effect, because they
are risk-averse (risk-seeking) for gains (losses) and there is
no offset over the entire portfolio. An intuitive reason why
people could engage in narrow framing in the stock market is
the complexity of the uncertainty involved. Managing a port-
folio requires decision making with the correlations between
stocks in mind. This task is cognitively demanding and it is
therefore easier to consider only individual stocks.
2.3. Representation
2.3.1. Gains and losses in the stock market
Before applying the evaluation methods in prospect the-
ory, investors first need to form a representation of the out-
4The disposition effect is the tendency to sell winners early and hold on
to losers.
comes associated with a state of the world. In the context
of stock market, it would be interesting to know how in-
vestors form a mental representation of a stock. What infor-
mation are they using as the basis for their decision making?
Prospect theory is defined over gains and losses. What is the
reference point for measuring gains and losses? In the fol-
lowing section, I briefly discuss important research related to
answering those questions.
The question of how to define a reference point in refer-
ence dependent models of preference, like prospect theory,
is not limited to behavioural finance. There is an ongoing
discussion in the related behavioural economics research, fo-
cussing on two main concepts for reference points. The first
proposed reference point is the status quo. An investor in the
stock market should care about returns on the wealth she in-
vested. The status quo then is a return of zero over the con-
sidered period, since it reflects the initial wealth. Benartzi
and Thaler (1995) for example use a return of zero as the
reference point and assume initial wealth is reset to the most
recent wealth for the subsequent evaluation period. Köszegi,
B. and Rabin, M. (2006) propose a different definition of the
reference point. In their model, the reference point is the
recently held expectations about an outcome. Imagine an in-
vestor who predicts a positive stock market trend in the near
future. She would expect an increase in stock prices and a
positive return on her investment. Her reference point based
on her expectations would be the increasing market return.
In a setting where no specific market trend is expected by the
investor, she could reasonably form her expectations based
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on the risk free rate5. Although the expectations-based def-
inition of the reference point makes intuitive sense, there is
one important assumption: individuals correctly predict the
environment they face. Even with a short horizon it is ques-
tionable whether investors can form correct expectations of
the market return or the risk-free rate and also predict their
own reaction to them. In their experiments, Baillon et al.
(2015) find support for the status quo being the preferred
reference point. However, in an empirical study by Lin and
Meng (2015), investors in the U.S. stock market have ref-
erence points above the risk-free rate, aligning closest with
their portfolios past returns. Since there is no conclusive ev-
idence on either side of the argument, three different refer-
ence points form part in my framework: zero or raw returns,
returns in excess of the risk-free rate and returns in excess
of the market. I do not make a specific distinction whether
they are based on status quo or expectations. Returns in ex-
cess of the market are the benchmark case, because investors
could reasonably compare their performance with the overall
performance of the stock market.
2.3.2. Information sources
With the reference points in mind, what source are in-
vestors using to determine returns? Information sources
probably vary greatly over time and investor groups. In
the preinternet era investment booklets could be a common
guide. In fact, Alexander et al. (1998) present survey results
from US mutual fund shareholders showing that investment
booklets are the most frequently used source of information.
Other sources in their survey include financial publications,
family and friends or brokers. Barberis et al. (2016) point
to the Value Line Investment Survey as an example of an
investment prospectus. Each stock page in this prospectus
shows a chart of past prices and a future price target on top,
fundamental variables over time in the middle and a written
analysis at the bottom6. The price chart is the only visual
representation of data and immediately catches the reader’s
eyes. It is not unreasonable to assume that the average indi-
vidual investor looking at this kind of prospectus would be
greatly influenced by the price chart in their decision making.
Further, the focus of these charts on past price developments
could suggest that past prices contain important information
on future prices. Therefore I assume that investors use past
prices to form their expectations about the future. Specifi-
cally investors are assumed to evaluate the attractiveness of
a stock based on past return distributions.
But the stock return information from the prospectus is
coded into the price charts. What investor biases could al-
ter the information during the transition from price charts
to returns? Nolte and Schneider (2018) test how the shape
of price paths influences investment decisions. Although the
underlying return distribution of each price path presented
5In theory, even the status quo could be the reference point based on
expectations, if the investor expects to retain initial wealth.
6See Appendix C, p. XII, where a sample stock page of the Value Line
Investment Survey is presented.
to their test subjects is equal, they find that that some price
paths are preferred to others. It seems that the framing of
price paths affects the perceived attractiveness of the under-
lying return distribution. It is also becoming clear that, in
the mind of an investor, asking for prices and asking for re-
turns is not essentially the same. Confronting subjects with
return instead of price charts can lead to lower expectations
(see Glaser et al. (2019)). Glaser et al. (2007) show that
subjects expect trend continuation if asked for future price
changes, while reverting to mean of the series if asked for fu-
ture price levels. This evidence suggests that investors do no
always end up with accurate stock returns, when gathering
information from price charts. As consequence using stock
returns observed in the marketplace as a depiction of the re-
turns investors have in mind might not be correct. This bias is
not only inherent to my framework, but also to other studies
applying prospect theory to the stock market (see e.g. Bar-
beris et al. (2016))7. The extent of this bias however depends
on the assumption that price charts are the sole information
source and on the fraction of unsophisticated investors in the
marketplace that cannot accurately discern the difference be-
tween prices and returns.
About half of my sample period belongs to the internet
era. Surely, this has an impact on the information sources
used by investors. First, the channel through which many in-
vestors trade has moved to brokerage firms that offer online
trading. This means that they receive a smaller amount of
professional advice from their brokers, but in turn can avoid
higher trading fees. Other new sources of information in
the internet era are online investment communities or free
financial websites like Yahoo Finance. Regarding the ques-
tion whether one single display method (price charts versus
return charts) is preferred, Glaser et al. (2019) observe no
clear pattern for the different sources. All of the online in-
vestment information sources have in common that they offer
investors much more data on stocks than in previous decades.
More available information should enhance investors per-
formance, but only if they can use it efficiently for their in-
vestment decisions. Keller and Staelin (1987) find that the
decision effectiveness of people decreases with the amount of
information. Information overload also causes subjects to opt
for simple investment alternatives in an experiment reported
by Agnew and Szykman (2005). When searching for infor-
mation online investors have access to much more frequent
data. This frequent feedback on stocks could actually hinder
performance, as investors focus narrowly on very recent data
and lose track of long term performance over multiple time
periods (see Lurie and Swaminathan (2009)).
2.3.3. Prospect theory value of return distributions
It seems hard to accurately discern which information,
and at what frequency, is used by each individual investor.
7In addition Benartzi and Thaler (1995) as well as Menkhoff and Schmel-
ing (2006) assume that investors evaluate stocks using past return distribu-
tions. Although they do not further specify how investors would get infor-
mation on past returns, there might be a possibility that the same bias is
inherent to their studies
M. Piehler / Junior Management Science 5(3) (2020) 262-294 269
In face of the uncomplete understanding on what gains and
losses are in the stock market, I make following assumptions:
(1) investors evaluate a stock based on its past return dis-
tribution, (2) investors track the stock’s performance with
monthly frequency and (3) they consider returns from the
past five years in the benchmark case. The assumption of
monthly returns is based on the idea that investors could
think that they can see trends emerging at this frequency,
which influences their perception of a stock. I use the same
lookback period for the return distributions as Barberis et al.
(2016) to keep comparability high. However, I also present
the results of the main analysis for other periods in Appendix
D. The prospect theory value is constructed as follows. For
each stock, the past sixty monthly returns are sorted from
most negative to most positive. The resulting return distri-
bution is equally weighted. As a consequence recent returns
have the same impact on the decision of an investor as the
earliest returns in the distribution:
(r−m, 1/60; r−m+1, 1/60; . . . ; r−1, 1/60; r0,
1/60; r1, 1/60; . . . ; rn, 1/60) (6)
For convenience, the form and subscripts of equation (6)
are equal to those of equation (1). It is easy to see that an
equally weighted distribution results in the same probability
for every outcome. The prospect theory value of this distribu-
tion then is the application of equations (2) until (5), keeping
in mind the fixed probability. Rearranged in to one equation,















w+(n− i + 1/60)−w+(n− i/60)

(7)
The parameters for the shape of the value and probability
weighting functions are taken from Tversky and Kahnemann
(1992). Other authors confirm the plausibility of their esti-
mation (see e.g. Abdellaui (2000) or Bruhin et al. (2010)).
3. Model of asset prices
3.1. The model by Barberis et al. (2016)
The starting point in the model stock market is the mean-
variance framework as proposed by classical Portfolio The-
ory. There are two types of assets; risky assets J with j ∈
{1, . . . , J} and the risk-free asset r f . A risky asset j earns re-
turn r j and is distributed around the mean µ j with standard
deviation σ j . Assets are traded by two types of investors. Ra-
tional investors ’arbitrageurs’ buy and sell stock maximizing
the Sharpe-Ratio of their portfolio. Put another way, they in-
vest in the tangency portfolio as proposed by Portfolio The-
ory. This portfolio has return rt , and the J x 1 vector wt de-
termines the weight of the risky assets J . On the other hand,
the individual investors exhibit prospect theory preferences.
While these investors also start by building the efficient tan-
gency portfolio, they chose to adjust their holdings positively
for stocks with high prospect theory value and negatively for
stocks with low prospect theory value. The asset weights in
their portfolio wp are given by:
wp = wt + kwT K (8)
for some k > 0, with wT K as the vector of weights in high
(low) prospect theory stocks. The weight of the j th stock in
the J × 1 vector of wT K , w
j
T K is:
w jT K = T K j − T K (9)
The variable T K refers to the prospect theory value of a
stock’s return distribution as in equation (7). In the bench-
mark case, the return distributions represent sixty monthly
returns in excess of the market. The individual investors in
this model do not sort their portfolio on absolute TK values
of stock, but rather on higher than average values. Accord-
ingly, T K is the average TK value of all stocks in J , formally
T K =
∑J
j=1 T K j/J .
The fraction of rational investors in the stock market is
π. Conversely, 1−π is the fraction of irrational investors that
adjust the tangency portfolio for stocks with high (low) TK
value. Later in this chapter I will argue that π decreases dur-
ing bubble periods. Given the fractions of the two types of
investors in the population, the market portfolio wm is:
wm = πwt + (1−π) (wt + kwT K)
= wt +ηwT K
(10)
where η= (1−π)k.
As stated above, the model of Barberis et al. (2016) starts
with a mean-variance framework. Specifically, the basis is the
matrix solution for the case of multiple risky assets and a risk-
free asset. Guided by this solution, they develop a model of
asset prices fitting the specifications in equations (8) through
(10). In the resulting model, the mean return of assets µ j is
given by:
µ j − r f
µm − r f
= β j −




= β j −
η
 





I present a commented proof of their model in the Ap-
pendix A. The β-factors are the product of regression of the
respective excess returns on the market excess returns. The
variable s2j is the covariance of the residuals from the regres-
sion of j’s excess returns. In equation (11) the mean excess
return equals β j of stock j, adjusted negatively for a term
which is increasing in the prospect theory value T K j of the
stock. This leads to the original prediction that stocks with
high prospect theory value earn low subsequent returns.
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3.2. Model extension and hypothesis
For the main part of my analysis, I test how this prediction
changes during bubble periods in the stock market. I extend
the model of Barberis et al. (2016) by partly reinterpreting
the variable η appearing in equation (11):
η= (1−π)k (12)
The term for the fraction of irrational investors (1−π) re-
mains unaltered in its interpretation. The factor k however
subsumes the extent to which rational investors face limits to
arbitrage. I argue that both of these factors increase during
bubbles. In the following paragraph I turn to the reinter-
pretation in more detail and show the effect of the proposed
increase in (1−π) and k on returns in equation (11).
As indicated in equation (8) individual investors split
their holdings between the tangency portfolio with weight
wt and prospect theory portfolio with weight wT K . The vec-
tor of weights wT K is scaled by some factor k > 0. There is no
further definition of this scaling factor. It subsumes all effects
that increase or decrease the weight in the prospect theory
portfolio. Limits to arbitrage for rational investors could
be a factor that increases the weight in the prospect theory
portfolio. During normal market conditions any mispricing
introduced by individual investors should be swiftly cor-
rected by contrary arbitrage positions of rational investors.
Because of arbitrage the influence of individual investor’s
preferences on prices and the weight of the prospect theory
portfolio in general are kept at low. If the limits to arbitrage
rise during bubbles, rational investors have less interest to
correct mispricing which gives the individual investor’s pref-
erences space to manifest themselves. So my argument is
that arbitrage provides a boundary to the power of indi-
vidual investors over stock prices. In summary, an increase
in the limits to arbitrage increases k which in turn leads
to a stronger weight in the prospect theory portfolio8. The
product of the fraction of individual investors (1 − π) and
the factor k determines the value of η, as in equation (12).
Because k scales the fraction of individual investors by the
extent of limits to arbitrage, η represents something akin to
the effective participation of individual investors in the stock
market. If k increases while keeping (1 − π) constant, the
impact of their preferences on prices still increases: the ef-
fective participation of individual investors is larger. During
bubble periods, both the fraction of individual investors and
the limits to arbitrage should increase. Therefore the effec-
tive participation of individual investors should increase as
well. The evidence supporting this proposition is presented
in chapter four. First however it is necessary to take a closer
look at the impact an increase in η has on the model in equa-
tion (11), which also leads up to my main hypothesis. If η
8Although I relate the factor k to the limit to arbitrage, it is a variable that
subsumes any factor that increases the weight in the prospect theory portfo-
lio. Because a high level of mispricing is one of the defining characteristics
of bubbles, I come to the conclusion that any hindrance to correct this mis-
pricing should lead to a higher weight in the prospect theory portfolio.
increases the numerator in the fraction on the right hand side
increases, while the denominator becomes smaller. The frac-
tion as a whole becomes larger, which increases the deviation
from β j . Put differently; an increase in either k or (1−π) i.e.
the effective participation of individual investors η increases
the mispricing and the deviation from rational prices based
on the risk factor β j . The formal proof of this intuition is the










where EX is an abbreviation for the mean excess return. The
proof for equation (13) is in Appendix B. Under the assump-
tion that the stock is high prospect theory value T K j > T K ,
an increase in η decreases excess returns. If T K j < T K then
the the excess return is rising in η. In the original predic-
tion, stocks with high (low) prospect theory values earn low
(high) subsequent returns. An increase in the effective par-
ticipation rate of individual investors seems to work in the
same direction. If η increases the effects should just be larger.
My main hypothesis is that stocks with high (low) prospect
theory values earn lower (higher) subsequent returns during
bubble periods compared to non-bubble periods. Formally,
the model representing this prediction is:
µ j − r f
µm − r f
= β j −
ηnon−bubble
 





µ j − r f
µm − r f
= β j −
ηbubble
 





where ηbubble > ηnon-bubble . This prediction is based on the
proposition that the limits to arbitrage and/or the fraction of
individual investors in the stock market increase. In the fol-
lowing chapter, I review the evidence for these propositions.
4. Review of the evidence
4.1. Limits to arbitrage
4.1.1. Arbitrage
Under the assumption of efficient markets all public in-
formation is incorporated into stock prices. In addition ra-
tional investors do not face constraints and can trade freely.
If individual investors entered this market and drove stock
price away from the fundamental value, rational investors
immediately try to profit and correct prices i.e. conduct ar-
bitrage. Since there are no constraints on trading, arbitrage
is risk-free and requires no capital and any mispricing after
price-shocks should quickly dissipate. What if the assump-
tion on no constraints to trading is lifted? Rational investor
now might not have the same incentive to correct mispric-
ing, because they are facing some risks. The existence of
risk associated with arbitrage means that rational investors
face limits to arbitrage, which make persistent mispricing of
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stocks possible. Barberis and Thaler (2003) identify three
main risks and costs associated with taking arbitrage posi-
tions that could impose limits to arbitrage: fundamental risk,
noise trader risk and implementation costs.
4.1.2. Risks associated with arbitrage
Fundamental risk
A risk factor facing the arbitrageur is changes in fundamental
value of stocks. If a rational investor determines that a stock
is undervalued, she would try to profit from the mispricing
and buy the stock at a low price. Imagine that the funda-
mental value of the cash flows suddenly decreases, because
unexpected negative company information arrives. The fun-
damental value now has dropped below the buying price and
the arbitrageur has incurred a loss. Although shorting is a
possibility, it might be hard to find a good substitute. Gromb
and Vayanos (2010) explain fundamental risk in two parts,
connected to cross-asset arbitrage and intertemporal arbi-
trage. Cross-asset arbitrage is rational investors exploiting
price discrepancies between two different assets at one point
in time, and intertemporal arbitrage is exploitation of price
differences for one asset at two points in time. They find the
impact of demand shocks on prices not only depends on the
ability to hedge risk but also the risk aversion of arbitrageurs.
Therefore fundamental risk could play an important role in
the decision making and investment process of arbitrageurs.
Noise trader risk
Noise traders are unsophisticated investors that react to noise
not related to actual cash flow information. Arbitrageurs face
the risk that noise traders drive prices further away from fun-
damental value for a longer period. As Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) point out, many rational investors do not invest their
own money but rather their clients’ money. The client may
have short time horizons and demand positive returns. With
this delegated portfolio management, clients could force the
arbitrageur to liquidate positions early. If the arbitrageur has
to liquidate before noise trader’s beliefs bounce back to orig-
inal levels, they incur a loss9. These problems do not only
occur with delegation from clients, but also from other par-
ties such as lenders, that make arbitrage not only risky but
costly.
Implementation costs
Since arbitrage often involves shorting stocks, it is important
to consider which costs are associated with such a transac-
tion. In order to sell stocks short, an arbitrageur has to bor-
row the stock by giving some collateral, in most cases cash.
Gromb and Vayanos (2010) point out that a low interest rate
earned on the collateral compared to the market is costly for
the arbitrageur. Further, the desired stock has to be short-
able in the first place. D’Avolio (2002) analyses the market
for borrowing stock and finds that most of the stocks in CRSP
9See De Long et al., 1990, p.705.
are shortable. Those that aren’t can be found in the cate-
gory of high illiquid stocks with low market capitalization.
In addition, he shows that high loan fees seem to be rare
on average, but high for some stocks. Duffie et al. (2002)
develop a model where borrowers and lenders in the stock
market bargain over the terms of their agreement. This leads
to friction cost if the lender has problems finding lendable
shares. Costs for conducting arbitrage transaction can also
come from insufficient capital. Arbitrageurs do not invest
their own money, so they either have to lend it directly or
attract investor capital. Gromb and Vayanos (2002) show
that financially constrained arbitrageurs are sometimes not
able to hold their arbitrage positions. If the difference be-
tween the arbitrageur’s position and the price increases, some
lenders might first require higher margins and then terminate
the loan, if possible. This is similar to the case of Shleifer and
Vishny (1997), where investors pull out capital when they see
a negative arbitrage position.
4.1.3. Measures for the limits to arbitrage
Proxies for the limits to arbitrage
Because the limits to arbitrage are difficult to measure by a
single variable, researchers have tried to find adequate ap-
proximations instead10. Mashruwala et al. (2006) rely on
idiosyncratic risk as a measure of the risk an arbitrage posi-
tion entails. Their argument is that only a part of a stock’s
volatility can be hedged, specifically the part that is known
to the arbitrageur, which is assumed to be the volatility ex-
plainable by the standard market model. The other part of
the stock’s volatility, coming from the residuals in the stan-
dard market model regression, is an approximation for the
absence of close substitutes in the hedging process. This ab-
sence is a limit to arbitrage and a risk that the arbitrageur
faces. Brav et al. (2009) also use idiosyncratic risk as a proxy
for limits to arbitrage, but take the residual variance from a
four-factor model, instead of the standard one-factor model.
Size is also considered a factor related to the limits of arbi-
trage. Because the stocks of firms with large market capi-
talization tend to be easier to trade, borrow or short, size is
an inverse estimate for the limits to arbitrage. In addition
to size, Ali et al. (2003) use several measures of transaction
costs to study the limits to arbitrage. They pick stock price as
a measure of direct transaction costs, because it is inversely
related to the bid-ask spread. Similar to Mashruwala et al.
(2006), they employ the dollar trading volume as an indirect
measure of transaction cost. A higher dollar trading volume
suggests that an arbitrage position could be executed without
delays and for low cost. Stoll (2000) also finds that the ask-
bid price spread is negatively related to measures of trading
activity, such as the average daily dollar trading volume. The-
oretically there should be fewer frictions when implement-
ing arbitrage strategies for stocks with high trading volume.
10See Chu et al., 2017, p.5-6, for an overview of different approximations
of limits to arbitrage.
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Therefore the dollar trading volume is an inverse proxy for
the limits to arbitrage.
Proxies for short-sale constraints
An arbitrageur has to have the ability to sell stock short, if
she wants to hedge against adverse effects to her arbitrage
position. As discussed in the paragraph on implementation
costs, frictions in the search process for shortable stocks can
be a limit to arbitrage. Chen et al. (2002) measure short-sale
constraints indirectly by looking at the breadth of ownership,
the number of investors with long positions in a stock. This
is based on an argument by Miller (1977) that if short-sale
constraints exist, stock prices are anchored around the val-
uation of optimists and pessimist do not have any impact
on prices. Therefore a low breadth of ownership, a sign
that mainly optimists trade a stock, should be an approxi-
mation of short-sale constraints. Nagel (2005) employs an-
other measure related to the ownership, institutional own-
ership. He argues that borrowing stock for shorting is eas-
ier for stocks with high institutional ownership, related to
the findings by D’Avolio (2002). Therefore high institutional
ownership should indicate a lower degree of short-sale con-
straints. Similarly, Hirshleifer et al. (2011) use institutional
holdings as proxy for availability of loanable shares. If the
loanable shares are scarce, short-selling is difficult. Finding
loanable shares should be easier for stock with high institu-
tional holdings. In a second strand of the literature, short in-
terest, the fraction of shares sold short to shares outstanding,
is a constraint on the arbitrageur side. While the proxies us-
ing institutional holdings variables focus on the supply side,
short interest can be seen as the demand side of the short-sale
constraint issue (Asquith et al. (2005)). In this framework, a
high short interest leads to more arbitrageurs competing for
the shortable shares, increasing cost and building a short-sale
constraint.
4.1.4. Limits to arbitrage and implementation costs during
bubbles
For the main part of my analysis it is important to think
about how the extent of limits to arbitrage could change
during bubble-periods compared to non-bubble periods.
I make a three-fold argument based on synchronization
issues (Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003)), resale options
(Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)) and implementation costs
(D’Avolio (2002)). Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) present
a model of how bubbles in asset prices can form and persist
due to synchronization issues among arbitrageurs. It is a de-
scription of how rational investor behaviour could result in a
failure to correct mispricing. In the model, assets prices are
assumed to deviate from fundamental value at some point.
One after another, the arbitrageurs become aware of the mis-
pricing. They have prior knowledge of how bubbles evolve.
Therefore they want to profit from the mispricing as long
as the bubble grows and exit right before it collapses. The
bursting of the bubble occurs when a sufficient amount of
arbitrageurs decides to sell off the positions that profit from
the mispricing. But they have no knowledge when other ar-
bitrageurs became aware of the bubble or when other will try
to cancel out their respective positions. Arbitrageurs have to
ty to time the market, because only a fraction of arbitrageurs
can exit before the bubble collapses. The incentive to cor-
rect any mispricing in asset prices is therefore delayed until
the point when a sufficient amount of arbitrageurs think the
bubble will burst soon. This is a strong argument for the
increased limits to arbitrage during bubble periods. Griffin
et al. (2011) support the model of delayed arbitrage by ra-
tional investors during the dotcom-bubble. They find that
institutional investors pull capital in the months before the
bubble bursts, while individual investors increase their ex-
posure. It seems that arbitrageurs drive the collapse of the
bubble and delay the correction of mispricing. Scheinkman
and Xiong (2003) offer a different approach to explain the
continued overvaluation of assets during bubbles. In their
model an investor not only buys an asset, but also the op-
tion for resale to others. The investors are not fully rational
and exhibit overconfidence. Every investor is confident that
her view of fundamental value is correct. This variability in
beliefs leads to a situation where the resale option for the
asset can be exercised with other overconfident investors,
which see higher fundamental value in the asset. There-
fore investors buy assets with prices in excess of their own
evaluation of fundamental value. The resulting mispricing
is a consequence of the irrational behaviour of investors. If
the overconfident investors make up a significant part of the
market, the limits to arbitrage rise. Another requirement
for successful arbitrage is the ability to sell short. D’Avolio
(2002) studies the characteristics of the market for lend-
ing and borrowing stock i.e. the processes underlying short
selling. In the sample, most stocks are shortable for rel-
atively low fees. Only few stocks demand very high loan
fees. However, short-selling becomes more difficult when
investor opinions on the value of a stock diverge. Imagine
a short seller with a stock valuation lower than the average
investor in the market. Since other investors are more op-
timistic, the lender could cancel the loan of the short seller
and receive a higher fee. The short seller can now either
close out the position by buying back the stock or chose to
pay a higher fee. In both situations the short seller faces
more costs associated with her position. It is reasonable to
assume that, during bubble periods, some investors over-
value more than other, similar to the overconfidence model
of Scheinkman and Xiong (2003). Therefore the short selling
cost should rise during bubble periods, increasing the lim-
its of arbitrage. In summary, any of the three explanations
makes for a theoretical argument to why limits to arbitrage
should rise during bubbles. Since evidence for the delayed
arbitrage model by Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) comes
from the time period of the tech bubble and this accounts for
the majority of bubble months I detect in my sample later,
it is the most appealing explanation. However, the delayed
arbitrage model cannot be measured with the proxies for
limits to arbitrage or short-sale constraints above. Analysing
the change in trading behaviour of arbitrageurs during the
bubble like Griffin et al. (2011) seems to be the only way
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to test the delayed arbitrage model. The explanation based
on Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) runs into similar issues.
While it makes intuitive sense that overconfident investors
continuously exercise resale options, it is hard to test. Ex-
planations based on investor behaviour in general run into
this issue. In these models, investors do not necessarily face
higher limits to arbitrage, because they consciously decide to
deviate from the own fundamental valuation of stocks. Only
later, when the price pressure of this type of investor is high,
arbitrageurs face higher limits to arbitrage.
4.2. Individual investor’s participation during bubbles
The second proposition related to my hypothesis is that
the fraction of irrational investors might increase during bub-
ble periods compared to non-bubble periods. How could ir-
rational investors be drawn in to participating in the stock
market? Maybe their decision to invest in stocks depends
on attention-grabbing news media coverage. If ever more
positive information of returns to be earned arrives, more ir-
rational investors might consider participating. Barber and
Odean (2008) find that individual investors buy stocks that
grab their attention, because they are faced with a search
problem. There are many stocks they could buy, but they can
only choose between those that they notice. Consequently
they buy stocks that recently grabbed their attention. In-
stitutional i.e. rational investors on the other hand do not
confront a search problem as large as individual investors.
They can narrow their search for stocks by demanding certain
criteria (for example sector or certain multiples). Therefore
institutional investors do not buy attention grabbing stocks
to the same extent. During bubble periods individual in-
vestors receive continuous positive information about a set of
stocks. They are incentivised to buy stocks driving the bubble
and contribute to the overvaluation. Effectively, they have a
greater influence on prices than during non-bubble periods.
The evidence on higher participation of irrational investors
during bubbles is scarce. Although Brennan (2004) observes
an increase in individual investors owning stock during the
time of the tech bubble, the reason was more the democ-
ratization of equity markets in the U.S. and not attention-
grabbing stock information. Since one of the bubbles my test
detects is the tech bubble, I might have to accept the notion
that this one time increase in individual investors in the U.S.
could drive results and not something inherent to all bub-
bles. However this would only be true if the results indicated
a long term change even after the tech bubble. As an argu-
ment, it does not seem unreasonable that more individual
investors will think about buying stocks during bubbles, be-
cause they are fed information about high returns.
In order to test my hypothesis and the propositions made,
it is necessary to detect and time-stamp bubbles in my sam-
ple. In the following chapter I therefore discuss what consti-
tutes a bubble and how to measure it, followed by presenting
the econometric test for bubbles I apply to my sample.
5. Bubbles
5.1. A short history of bubbles
When hearing about bubbles, a sharp rise in prices cou-
pled with investor euphoria and a subsequent bounce back of
prices to pre-bubble levels comes to mind. Although bubbles
seem like a new phenomenon, many date them back until
the tulip mania that occurred in the Netherlands leading up
to 1637. There, prices for rare species of tulips increased
rapidly until, in some cases, they crashed to 10 percent of
their maximum11. Two other commonly identified bubbles
before the start of the 20th century are the Mississippi bub-
ble and the South Sea Bubble. Both shared similar character-
istics, they occurred when private enterprises sought to refi-
nance government debt. The Mississippi bubble was closely
connected to the French Compagnie des Indes, which succes-
sively took over large projects like collecting taxes or running
trade monopolies outside Europe, financed by the issuances
of shares. In the beginning stages of the Compagnie des In-
des shares sold at 500 livres. From the start of the expan-
sion if its operations in April 1719 to the height of the bub-
ble share prices rose to 10,000 livres in February 1720 until
falling sharply after May 1720. The South Sea Bubble hap-
pened during the same time period, but the English South Sea
company had the refinancing of government debt as its only
goal. The acquisition of government debt was again finance
through share issues. From January until July 1720 the share
prices rose from close to 100 pounds to 900 pounds, before
crashing down in September. Although both of these devel-
opments are often seen as bubbles, Garber (1990) argues that
there were rational explanations for the respective price de-
clines12. The next period of explosive prices probably is more
well-known today: the bubble leading up to the great mar-
ket crash in 1929. White (1990) attributes the bull markets
in the 1920s to the stable growth after the post-war recession
and large companies’ trend towards equity financing of new
plants and equipment. In addition, commercial banks started
to make investment for individuals easier through investment
trusts. While stock prices and dividends commoved during
most of the 1920s, prices started to run away from 1928 on-
wards up to the crash13. For the following decades there is
now consensus whether bubbles existed in the financial mar-
kets. One of these shorter and more contested bubbles is
the one before Black Monday in October 1987. Some argue
that it was computer high frequency trades that caused the
crash but there is no broadly accepted version of why a bub-
ble could have existed. The most recently recorded bubble
in stock prices is the tech bubble in the late 1990s. Driven by
the promise of the internet economy, investors heavily bought
in to stocks of technology firms, although the fundamentals
did not justify the high valuations. Shiller (2000) describes
how investors often willingly ignored concerning facts and
11See Garber, 1990, p.37.
12See Garber, 1990, for an overview of the three bubbles and alternative
explanations.
13See White, 1990, Figure 3, p.73.
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were blinded by positive news coverage. Ofek and Richard-
son (2002) show that the internet sector was highly overval-
ued, where the valuations of a quarter of the firms suggest a
required excess return on capital of almost 50 percent over a
10 year period14.
5.2. Detecting bubbles in asset prices
Because of the enormous impact bubbles can have on
the economy and the livelihoods of many people, economists
have tried to develop methods for testing explosiveness in
asset prices. Gürkaynak, R. S. (2008) provides a survey of
the literature on econometric methods. These methods rely
on the rational bubble model, where the price is not only
based on cash flow streams from dividends and fundamen-
tals, but also has a bubble component. Investors incorpo-
rate this component into their valuation and accept the corre-
sponding prices. The variance bound test by Shiller (1981) is
based on a model of dividend cash flows. With perfect knowl-
edge of the future dividend streams, the asset price would
reflect the present value of the resulting cash flows. Since
investors don’t know the future, the price reflects the present
value of expected dividends plus the forecast error. Conse-
quently, the variance of this price together with the variance
of the forecast error should be equal to the variance of prices
with perfect knowledge. If they exceed this variance bound,
a possible reason is the existence of a bubble in prices. There
are several issues with this method. First, it should be noted
that it was originally not supposed to be a specific test for
bubbles, but rather market efficiency. However, Marsh and
Merton (1986) conclude that the variance bound test does
not even test for market rationality, when changing the as-
sumptions underlying the stochastic process for dividends.
In addition it can only be applied as an ex post test, because
the calculation of the variance bound requires information
on prices formed on perfect knowledge. West (1987) devel-
ops another test that is supposed to indirectly prove the ex-
istence of bubbles. The starting point is a model where asset
prices are determined by the discounted dividend streams.
The basic idea is to compare a set of parameters from dif-
ferent regressions, one run on an actual time-series and the
other one run on simulated data. The first set of parameters
is obtained from a regression of the stock price on lagged
dividends. The second set comes from a pair of equations,
determining the dividend process and discount rate. Because
both regressions estimate the same model, there is no bubble
if the parameters are equal. If there is a bubble the underly-
ing model is slightly different from before. Now asset prices
are determined by discounted dividends and a bubble com-
ponent. The parameter estimates from the regression with
actual data are then biased. However, the second set of pa-
rameters obtained by simulation is still consistent. The test
by West (1987) compares the two sets of parameters. If they
are different after controlling for sampling errors, this is in-
direct evidence of a bubble. Problems for this method arise
14See Ofek and Richardson, 2002, p.270.
in the specification of the stochastic process for dividends.
Both of the test presented until now rely on ruling out any
other option than bubbles, instead of testing for them di-
rectly. Diba and Grossman (1988) design a more direct test
of bubbles and lay the foundation for the test by Phillips et al.
(2015a,b) that I use to detect bubbles. Prices in their model
are determined by dividends and unobservable fundamen-
tals. Essentially, they conclude that if no bubble exists, the
processes for dividends and prices should be stationary after
the equal amount of differencing. The explosive process for
bubbles in their model breaks this relationship. Therefore a
bubble exists if the same amount of differencing that makes
the process for dividends stationary, does not make prices
stationary, which can be tested with unit-root tests. Evans
(1991) doubts the power of such tests. He shows that the
specification of the explosive bubble process is problematic:
for periodically collapsing bubbles, unit root tests have low
power of detecting an explosive process. Diba and Grossman
(1988) assume that bubbles cannot restart after bursting and
therefore their test would fail to detect explosive prices with
periodically collapsing bubbles. Although the idea behind
the test is promising, reliably testing for bubbles requires a
different method, where unit root tests do not lose detection
power. This is the issue that Phillips et al. (2015a,b) address
with their method that I present in the next section.
5.3. The Phillips et al. (2015a) approach for bubble detec-
tion
5.3.1. Rational bubble model
In a recent series of papers Phillips et al. (2011) and
Phillips et al. (2015a,b) develop a new approach based on
unit root testing that aims to correct for theses fallacies. In
order to understand hoy unit root tests can help to identify
explosiveness in asset prices, it is useful to start with a ratio-










Et (Dt+i + Ut+i) + Bt (16)
where Pt is the after-dividend price of the asset, Dt is the
payoff from dividends, Ut represents the unobservable fun-
damentals and Et is an expectation operator. Accordingly
the price of an asset depends on two components. A fun-
damental component that is based on expected cash flows
from dividends Dt and fundamentals Ut , dubbed P
f
t here,




t + Bt (17)
The stochastic process underlying the bubble component






15See Phillips et al., 2011, Figure 2, p.204, for an illustration of this kind
of process.
M. Piehler / Junior Management Science 5(3) (2020) 262-294 275
Therefore the expected value for the bubble component
in t +1 is an increasing function of the bubble component in
t. This is in accordance with the self-reinforcing price expec-
tations during bubbles. Under the assumption that Bt = 0
asset prices are driven by the characteristics of Dt and Ut .
If now the stochastic processes for dividends and unobserv-
able fundamentals are at most integrated of order one, then
the fundamental component P ft in general is at most inte-
grated of order one, then the fundamental component P ft in
general is at most integrated of order one. In this case as-
set prices follow a random walk. If there is a bubble in asset
prices i.e. (Bt ≥ 0) , then the explosive process described in
equation (18) would dominate the behaviour of asset prices.
Therefore it is possible to infer the existence of a bubble by
testing whether prices follow a random walk or an explosive
autoregressive process. One disadvantage of testing prices
is the possibility that the detected explosiveness is driven by
the fundamental component rather than a bubble. Using the
price-dividend ratio controls for a false positive interpreta-
tion of test results, assuming that the unobservable funda-
mentals are still at most driven by a I(1) process. Under the
null hypothesis asset prices follow the process in equation
(19):
yt = dT




,θ = 1 (19)
where d is a constant, T is the sample size and η is a control
for the size of the intercept as the sample size approaches in-
finity. Phillips et al. (2015a) focus on the case of η ≥ 1/2,
for which the martingale component dominates the drift and
yt is close to a pure random walk. Phillips et al. (2014)
report on the sensitivity of right-tailed unit root testing to
specification of the null hypothesis. Instead of testing the
null for stationarity against a random walk with intercept
or trend, a random walk is the null against the explosive
alternative. This corresponds to analysing the right tail of
the distribution in unit root testing. To test for a unit root,
Phillips et al. (2015a) apply Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF
hereafter) tests on different subsamples using rolling regres-
sions with sample start r1 and end r2 using following form:




ψ̂ir1,r2∆yt−i + ε̂t (20)
where k is the number of lags and the ADF statistic is the
t-statistic of the β-coefficient. The recursive approach is cho-
sen based on the critique by Evans (1991) that unit root tests
incorrectly detect stationary behaviour in a model with peri-
odically collapsing bubbles.
5.3.2. SADF and GSADF test
The supremum augmented Dickey-Fuller test (SADF
hereafter) is the first method that Phillips et al. (2011) de-
velop, which applies unit root tests to an expanding sample
sequence. The test statistic is obtained by running the re-
gression in equation (20) on this sequence. Define the total
sample as running on an interval of [0, 1], r0 as the minimum
window size for the regression and r1 and r2 as the starting
point and endpoint of the subsample, respectively. The first
regression runs on the minimum window size r0. Leaving the
starting point r1 fixed, the sample size increases by one ob-
servation at a time until the total sample size is reached. The
supremum value of the resulting ADF test statistic sequence
is the SADF test:





Imagine for example a series of 100 observations and a fixed
minimum window size r0 = 0.1. The first ADF test would
then run a regression on observations 1 through 10, the sec-
ond on observations 1 through 11 etc. until the last regres-
sion included all 100 observations. Figure 3 illustrates this
procedure. Several papers explore this recursive approach
for other unit root tests, such as the Bhargava (1986) statis-
tic, the Busetti and Taylor (2004) statistic, the Kim (2000)
statistic or the Chow-type Dickey-Fuller statistic16.
The extension of this test is the general supremum aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller test (GSADF hereafter) by Phillips et al.
(2015a). This test is based on the same concept as the SADF
test, but the number of subsamples used is much larger. In-
stead of only varying the endpoint r2, the starting point r1 is
flexible as well. This double-recursive procedure is meant to
make the detection of periodically collapsing bubbles more
precise. Figure 4 illustrates the formation of subsamples the
test is performed on. The GSADF test then is the supremum
value of the resulting ADF test statistic sequence:
GSADF (r0) = sup ADF
r2
r1
r2 ∈ [r0, 1]
r1 ∈ [0, r2 − r0]
(22)
The recommendation for the minimum window size r0 is de-
pendent on the size of the full sample T according to the rule
r0 = 0.01 + 1.8
p
T . On the one hand this ensures that the
initial window is small enough to capture explosive price be-
haviour early in the sample if T is large. On the other hand
the initial window is big enough for adequate estimation if T
is small.
5.3.3. Time stamping bubbles
For empirical application it is important to know not only
whether bubbles exist in a sample, but also when they orig-
inate and terminate. Since real-time stamping of bubbles is
an important concern in practice, Phillips et al. (2015a) use
a backward-looking implementation of the SADF test, called
the backward sup augmented Dickey-Fuller test (BSADF
hereafter). The endpoint r2 is held fixed, while the starting
point r1 expands backwards towards the beginning of the
full sample. The BASDF is then again the supremum value
16See Homm and Breilung, 2012, for a comparative analysis of these test
statistics.
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Figure 3: The SADF Test (Based on Phillips et al., 2015a, p.1049).
Set r1 = 0 and r2 ∈ [r0, 1]. Use initial window [0, r2] and expand r2.
Figure 4: The GSADF Test (Based on Phillips et al., 2015a, p.1049).
Set r1 = [0, r2 − r0] and r2 ∈ [r0, 1] . Use moving window [r1, r2].
of the resulting statistics sequence:







Similar to the double-recursive sampling technique of the
GSADF test, varying the endpoint r2 results in a statistic se-
quence of BSADF tests. This sequence consists of one BSADF
statistic for every observation of the original sample provided
the minimum window size restriction is fulfilled. Working
from the first chronological test statistic to the last, bubble









r̂ f = inf
r2∈[r̂e+δ log(T )/T,1]
¦





where scvβTr2 is the critical value for the ADF statistic based
on Tr2 observations. Here it is important to notice that a
critical value is needed for every month in the sample. The
origination of a bubble r̂e is then the first chronological ob-
servation that passes the respective critical value. In order to
avoid spurious explosive behaviour to be identified as a bub-
ble a minimum duration based on sample size is required.
After origination the explosive behaviour should persist at
least for δ log(T ) observations. This rule is somewhat arbi-
trary, since δ is a parameter that can be chosen freely accord-
ing to the frequency of the data and assumed minimum bub-
ble duration. For example, if the data frequency is monthly,
sample size T = 480 and bubbles should last a half a year
at minimum, then δ ≈ 2.2. The end of a bubble r̂ f is the
first observation after r̂e + δ log(T ) that falls below the crit-
ical value. This procedure can be used to time-stamp multi-
ple bubbles that periodically expand and collapse, not only
in stock prices, but also in many other assets traded on ex-
changes.
5.3.4. Other applications
Since its inception the BSADF test has been applied to de-
tect bubbles in several assets. Cheung et al. (2015) search for
bubbles in bitcoin prices, which seem to be driven by specu-
lative behaviour. They find several smaller bubbles and one
large bubble, collapsing the Mt. Gox exchange in 2014. Caspi
et al. (2018) set out to detect explosiveness in oil prices. They
test the nominal oil price against prior levels and the general
price level in the U.S. and find periods of explosiveness in
the 1970s and 1980s, as well as before the financial crisis
in 2008. Escobari and Jafarinejad (2016) detect bubbles in
real estate investment trust and are able to capture, among
others, the reflection of the housing bubble before 2008. Hu
and Oxley (2017) search for explosiveness in currency ex-
change rates and conclude that there were no bubbles in the
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G10 countries during 1990 and 2014. In summary, this ev-
idence suggests that the approach by Phillips et al. (2015a)
can be readily applied to detect bubbles in a broad range of
settings. I now turn to the application of this test to the U.S.
stock markets.
5.4. Bubbles in the S&P 500
5.4.1. Data
The tests for the existence of bubbles and their time-
stamping are performed on the S&P 500. This index covers
approximately 80% of all available market capitalization of
American equities17. The data for the S&P 500 is taken from
Robert Shiller’s website at Yale18. It consists of the monthly
time-series of the index price, dividend and earnings. Addi-
tionally a consumer price index published by the U.S. Bu-
reau of Labour Statistics allows for the conversion to real
values. The data sampled stretch over 480 monthly observa-
tions from January 1978 up to December 2017. As indicated
by the “rational bubble” model in section 5.3.1, using the
price-dividend ratio controls for false positive interpretation
of results. To obtain the price dividend ratio, I first compute
the percentage dividend yield, which is real dividend divided
by real price. The price dividend ratio then is the reciprocal
value of the percentage dividend yield. The tests for bubbles
run test regressions on an index of this price dividend ratio,
starting with value 100 in January 1978.
5.4.2. SADF test of the S&P 500
Before applying the unit root test to the S&P 500 data, I
obtain critical values under the null hypothesis by simulating
the stochastic process specified in equation (19). The pa-
rameters controlling the size of the intercept are set to one
i.e. d = η= 1. As discussed earlier, the data-generating pro-
cess is then close to a pure random walk. The Monte-Carlo
simulations for the finite sample critical values run over 480
observations with 1,000 replications. The SADF test statistic
is stored for every replication. The basis for the 90%, 95%
and 99% right-tailed critical values is the statistics sequence
resulting from all replications. As suggested by Phillips et al.
(2015a), the lag order is small and fixed, at k = 1, and the
minimum window size for the recursive rolling regressions in
the SADF test is 44 observations following their rule. I do not
calculate the GSADF test statistic because the increased num-
ber of subsamples makes simulations of critical values much
more extensive computationally. The alternative hypothesis
of explosive behaviour is tested by running an SADF test on
the S&P 500 data. Table 1 shows the finite sample critical val-
ues and the SADF test results. With a test statistic of 2.428
the SADF test surpasses its critical values at all significance
levels. There is strong evidence for the existence of bubble(s)
in the indexed price-dividend ratio of the S&P 500. These re-
sults are similar to the results reported by aforementioned
authors.
17See the S&P 500 website, https://eu.spindices.com/indices/equ
ity/sp-500.
18See “U.S. Stock Markets 1871-Present and CAPE Ratio”, www.econ.yal
e.edu/~shiller/data.htm.
5.4.3. Time stamping of bubbles in the S&P 500
After establishing that one or more bubbles exist in the
S&P 500, I turn to the BSADF test (equations (23) to (25)) to
determine the exact number of bubbles and the time stamp-
ing of each bubble. First critical values for the BSADF tests
are obtained by Monte-Carlo simulations with 1,000 replica-
tions. The calculation is more complex than for finite sam-
ple critical values, since the simulations run on each subsam-
ple in the sequence Tr2. In the end, there is a critical value
for every observation; each based on the number of months
passed until that point in the sample. Just as for the SADF,
the minimum window size is 44 observations and the order
of lags is fixed at k = 1. I then compare this sequence of
simulated critical values to the BSADF test statistic sequence
for the price-dividend ratio of the S&P500. In accordance
with the crossing-time equations in (24) and (25), the start-
ing point of a bubble is the first chronological observation in
the sequence, where the BSADF test statistic passes its corre-
sponding 95% critical value. The assumption is that a bubble
has to last at least six months in order to be considered as
such. Therefore if the observation six months after the test
statistic first passed the critical value remains above the crit-
ical value, this time period in the S&P 500 is considered a
bubble. Any observation that drops below its critical value
afterwards is the end of the bubble. The arbitrary definition
of a six month minimum bubble period (or any other chosen
duration) seems to be one of the biggest issues for correctly
specifying the BSADF test in empirical applications. What if,
for example month five and seven after the start of the bub-
ble surpass their respective critical values, but month six does
not? The dating algorithm in equations (24) and (25) would
not capture this time period as a bubble. Although I did not
run into this problem, I attempt to use averaged values over
a time span in order to avoid short dips (e.g. month six in
the example) in the BSADF test statistic sequence. However,
the definition of average values inevitably becomes arbitrary
as well: it is not clear how many months should be used for
averaging. The conclusion is that economic intuition has to
be applied. It is unreasonable to assume that the bubble sud-
denly stops for one or two months. Ex post it is therefore
best to fill in theses gaps, if they are just short breaks. If
one wants to apply the BSADF test as a real time detector for
bubbles, this is a bigger issue since it is not clear whether the
drop is the end of the bubble or just a short break. Despite
these problems, the time-stamping of bubbles seems to be
surprisingly accurate. Figure 5 shows the BSADF test statis-
tic sequence plotted against the 95% critical value sequence
for the entire sample. The grey areas are the bubble periods
identified by the BSADF test. They coincide with two bubbles
corresponding to the tech bubble in the late 20th century and
the lead-up to the crash of Black Monday in 1987. In fact, the
starting point of the bubble is 1995m12, exactly one month
later as reported by Phillips et al. (2015a). The ending point
of the tech bubble indicated by my tests is 2000m9, which is
eleven months earlier. Due to the characteristics of the time
stamping algorithm described earlier, there are two short
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Table 1: The SADF test with critical values for the S&P 500 (Based on Phillips et al., 2015a, p.1066).
The table shows the results of running the SADF test specified in equation (21) on the indexed price-dividend ratio of the S&P 500. The sample stretches
over 480 monthly observations, from January 1978 to December 2017. The finite sample critical values are obtained via Monte-Carlo simulation with 1,000
replications.
Finite sample critical values
SADF 90% 95% 99%
2.428 1.227 1.568 1.998
breaks between explosive periods that are assumed to be part
of the tech bubble. In addition there are two visible spikes of
the BSADF tests statistic. The first spike indicates explosive
prices leading up to the market crash in October starting in
1987m2. This is the second and much shorter bubble I detect
in the S&P 500. The second spike coincides with the financial
crisis and passes the critical value sequence from 2008m10
to 2009m3. The detection of a crisis period as explosive is
an issue that Phillips and Shi (2018) try to address by imple-
menting a wild bootstrap for the critical values. Phillips et al.
(2015a) again find similar periods of explosive prices, but the
start and end are different. From their online appendix19,
it becomes clear that they use a variable lag depending on
Bayesian information criteria, while I use a fixed lag. In my
own informal tests I find that the specification of the lags in
the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests influences results. There-
fore the differences could be due to using fixed versus vari-
able lags. Figure 6 shows the real price and price-dividend
ratio of the S&P500 for my sample as well as the bubble peri-
ods indicated earlier. The BSADF test runs regression of the
time-series of the indexed price-dividend ratio (the dotted
line in Figure 6). As discussed when presenting the ratio-
nal bubble model (equation (16)), this is necessary for the
correct specification of bubbles. The detected bubble peri-
ods coincide well with price increases in the real price index
of the S&P500, but only when dividends are not keeping up
with this increase. For example, the BSADF test does not de-
tect a bubble in the period from 2016 onwards, although the
price of the S&P500 reaches record highs. This is because the
price dividend ratio remains more or less constant. Of course
the BSADF test is always limited to the specific timer series
analysed. The detection of bubbles, say in housing prices,
requires a separate implementation of the test. In summary,
the bubble periods I detect coincide with the tech bubble and
the lead up to Black Monday. They run from December 1995
to September 2000 and from February 1987 to August 1987,
respectively. The strategy for the empirical analysis is to split
the sample into two different sub samples. The first sample
contains all months that were not stamped as a bubble and
the second sample contains all months that were stamped as
a bubble. This allows me to analyse the changes in the re-
lationships between returns, the prospect theory value and
other important control variables. It is therefore not only a
19See https://sites.google.com/site/shupingshi/GSADF.zip?
attredirects=0.
test of my hypothesis that stocks with high prospect theory
value earn lower returns during bubbles, but also gives an
indication how the predictive power of other variables varies
with market conditions.
6. Prospect theory and stock returns during bubbles
6.1. Empirical approach
Barberis et al. (2016) show that stock with high (low)
prospect theory value earn low (high) subsequent returns.
Earlier, I made the prediction that this relationship should be
more pronounced during bubble periods compared to non-
bubble periods. In order to these two predictions in my sam-
ple, I rely on several tests. The first tests are portfolio sorts
with a low high prospect theory value strategy that should
earn abnormal returns if the predictions hold. These include
checks for robustness, where the parameters for constructing
the prospect theory value or the underlying sample are modi-
fied. In order to test the main predictions in the cross-section
of returns, I use the Fama-Macbeth approach. This lets me
test while controlling for known return predictors. The plau-
sibility of the rising limits to arbitrage argument is evaluated
using the same method, but the regressions include an inter-
action term of prospect theory value with different approx-
imations for the limits to arbitrage, as presented in section
4.1.3. In the last section I look at the underlying components
of prospect theory likely to cause the observed relationship




The data for the empirical analysis is provided by Whar-
ton Research Data Services. The CRSP/WRDS Merge database
is the source for monthly security information of all compa-
nies listed on US stock exchanges, namely security identifiers,
exchange codes and prices. The fundamental information on
these companies is obtained from the Compustat database.
Besides balance sheet items it also contains information re-
lated to security markets like common shares outstanding,
all sampled with yearly frequency. The Fama and French
database is the basis for the monthly market returns and
risk-free rate. The sample for these three datasets starts in
January 1978 and ends in December 2017, corresponding
to the time period used for the time-stamping of bubbles.
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Figure 5: The BSADF test for bubbles in the S&P 500 (Based on Phillips et al., 2015a, p.1066).
The graph shows the results of the BSADF test procedure. The bold line represents the test statistic for the indexed price-dividend ratio of the S&P 500, the
red-dotted line are the 95% critical values obtained via Monte-Carlo simulations with 1,000 replications for each point in time. The sample of the S&P 500
starts in Janaury 1978 and ends in December 2017. The dotted black line represents the end of the minimum window for estimation.
Figure 6: Bubbles in the S&P 500 (Based on Phillips et al., 2015a, p.1066).
The graph shows the results of the BSADF test procedure. The bold line is the price index of the S&P 500, adjusted for inflation. The dashed line is the index
of the price-dividend ratio fo the S&P 500, again with prices adjusted for inflation. The sample of the S&P 500 starts in Janaury 1978 and ends in December
2017. The dotted black line represents the end of the minimum window for estimation.
In addition, I need daily data on prices and trading volume,
which comes from CRSP/WRDS Merged daily. The daily
data sample starts in January 1983 and ends in December
2017, as available. After merging the four datasets, I exclude
stocks from smaller exchanges because of missing price in-
formation. The stocks in the final dataset are listed on NYSE,
NYSE Amex, NASDAQ-NMS, NASDAQ OMX BX or NYSE
Arca. Finally, stocks are required to have a history long
enough as to make the calculation of the prospect theory
value possible i.e. a history of at least 60 months.
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6.2.2. Data Summary
Table 2 summarizes the variable for prospect theory
value, dubbed TK, and the control variables I use in the
empirical analysis. In addition, Table 3 shows the correla-
tions of all variable. TK is the prospect theory value of a
stock’s return distribution, computed following equation (7).
In the benchmark case, the return distribution consists of the
past 60 monthly returns. Size is the log of the market value
of equity in month t-1, obtained by multiplying the common
shares outstanding at the end of year t-1 with the end of
month price. Beta is a stock’s beta as in Fama and French
(1992). Each June of a given year stocks are sorted into 100
portfolios based on size and pre beta, a stock’s market beta
over the last six years. Then the return of each portfolio in the
following year is used in a regression on the market return
in the current and prior month. Beta is the sum of the coef-
ficients from this regression. Bm is the log book-to-market
ratio computed as the difference of the logs of book value of
equity and market value of equity. The book value of equity
is the shareholder’s equity minus the preferred stock value.
Following Daniel and Titman (2006), shareholder’s equity
is approximated by stockholder’s equity. If the stockholder’s
equity is missing, I replace it with common equity plus pre-
ferred stock par value or assets minus liabilities plus book
minority interest, as available. The preferred stock value is
redemption, liquidation or carrying value in that order. After
subtracting the stockholder’s equity with the preferred stock
value, book deferred taxes are added to get the final book
value of equity. Mom is the control for the momentum effect
reported by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), the cumulative
return from month t-12 to t-2. Illiq is Amihud (2002) mea-
sure for illiquidity, the average ratio of absolute return to
dollar trading volume in month t-1. Further controls include
rev, for the short term reversal, an ltrev, for the long term
reversal. Rev is a stock’s return in t-1, while ltrev is the cu-
mulative return from t-60 to t-13. Max is the maximum daily
return in month t-1, while Min is the negative of the lowest
return in month t-1. Skew is the sample skewness of re-
turns over the past five years. Because probability weighting
is an important factor for the prospect theory value, skew-
ness should be included in the analysis (see Barberis and
Huang (2008)). The computation for the variables starts
in January 1983 to match the minimum window required
by the time-stamping of the bubbles and stock requirements
mentioned earlier. On average, the prospect theory value
of a stock’s return distribution is negative, which is in accor-
dance with the result in Barberis et al. (2016). Menkhoff and
Schmeling (2006) also find that the prospect theory value of
simulated return distributions tends to be negative. Table 3
presents the correlations between TK and the control vari-
ables employed. Beta is negatively correlated to the prospect
theory value of a stock. Probability weighting could be an
intuitive explanation for the positive relation between the
prospect theory value of a stock and the sample skewness.
A skewed return distribution should be preferred, since tails
are assigned higher weights in prospect theory. TK is also
positively correlated with the controls for past return anoma-
lies, namely momentum, short term reversal and long term
reversal. The correlation with ltrev is the strongest out of all
control variables. It is also the variable that is constructed
with the return information closest to TK. The reason behind
the positive correlation with mom and rev should be similar,
although the correlation coefficient on rev seems particularly
large considering it represents only one month of shared re-
turn information. Finally, TK is positively related to size, the
log market value of equity, and negatively related to the log
book-to-market ratio Bm. Looking at correlations is only a
first rough approximation of the relationship between the
variables, therefore I now turn to the first step laid out in the
empirical approach, portfolio analysis of stocks sorted on the
prospect theory values.
6.3. Portfolio sorts on prospect theory value
Sorting stocks into portfolios on prospect theory values
make it possible to exploit the prediction that high prospect
theory value stocks should earn low returns. The portfolio
with the highest TK values should earn the lowest returns
and the portfolio with the lowest TK values should earn the
highest returns. If the prediction is correct, going short and
long in these portfolios, respectively, should generate pos-
itive excess returns. This approach of building long-short
portfolios is popular in the finance literature, especially as
a first assessment of the power of anomalies. For example,
momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)) is exploited by
forming such a portfolio, only with past winners and losers.
It is also a well-known strategy for asset pricing tests (e.g.
Fama and French (1996)), although Berk (2000) points out
that sorting into many groups could weaken otherwise strong
explanatory power of pricing models. I begin building the
TK portfolios by sorting stocks into deciles based on their
prospect theory values starting in January 1983 and ending
in December 2017. For each of the ten portfolios formed on
TK, the average equal weighted return over the next month
is computed. The returns in the benchmark case are in ex-
cess of the market. The long-short portfolio takes a long po-
sition in the low TK portfolio (decile one) and a short po-
sition in the high TK portfolio (decile ten). This portfolio
should generate positive excess returns, if the prediction is
accurate. Table 4 shows the results of the portfolio sorts on
prospect theory value. Decile one offers the highest average
returns while decile ten exhibit’s the lowest returns. Conse-
quently, the low high TK portfolio earns positive returns. The
excess returns to this strategy are highly significant. Overall,
all decile portfolios are significant at least at the 10% level.
The significance of the low TK and high TK decile is most im-
portant, since the return on the portfolio rely on both. While
I use equal weighted returns, Barberis et al. (2016) also look
at value weighted returns. They present similar results and
show that the low-high TK portfolio even generates excess
returns with value-weighting. Further, they show that the
predictive power of prospect theory values for returns lasts
for several months, although the level of excess returns de-
clines very fast after the first month. My second prediction
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Table 2: Summary statistics.
The table shows mean, standard deviation and median for each of the variables used in the empirical analysis over the period starting in January 1983 and
ending December 2017. TK is the prospect theory value of a stock’s return calculated using a distribution of the past 60 returns. Size is the logarithm of the
market value of equity. Beta is a stock’s beta based on 100 portfolio sorted on size and pre-beta as in Fama and French (1992). Bm is the log book-to-market
ratio, calculated as the difference of the logarithm of the book value of equity and the logarithm of the market value of equity. Mom is the momentum of a
stock; the cumulative return from month t-12 to t-2. Illiq is the illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002), scaled by 105. Rev is the return in month t-1. Ltrev is
the cumulative return of a stock from month t-60 to t-13. Max is the highest daily return in month t-1, while Min is the negative of the lowest daily return.
Skew is the sample skewness of returns over the past five years.
Variables Mean SD Median
TK -0.078 0.032 -0.075
Size 5.902 2.115 5.759
Beta 1.058 0.297 1.046
Bm -0.575 0.821 -0.500
Mom 0.099 0.394 0.081
Illiq 0.122 0.610 0.002
Rev 0.010 0.123 0.004
Ltrev 0.412 0.753 0.344
Max 0.065 0.593 0.042
Min 0.052 0.052 0.038
Skew 0.0534 0.893 0.146
Table 3: Correlation matrix.
The table shows the correlation between TK and the control variables presented in Table 2. The sample starts in January 1983 and ends in December 2017.
TK Beta Size Bm Mom Illiq Rev Ltrev Skew Max Min
TK 1.00
Beta -0.22 1.00
Size 0.35 0.01 1.00
Bm -0.15 -0.07 -0.32 1.00
Mom 0.21 0.05 0.08 -0.09 1.00
Illiq -0.26 -0.01 -0.33 0.16 -0.10 1.00
Rev 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 1.00
Ltrev 0.44 0.16 0.15 -0.34 -0.08 -0.14 -0.02 1.00
Skew 0.21 0.19 -0.27 0.10 0.24 0.09 0.10 0.22 1.00
Max -0.06 0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.07 0.07 -0.02 0.02 1.00
Min -0.36 0.17 -0.25 0.02 -0.05 0.31 -0.31 0.00 0.05 0.08 1.00
was that high (low) prospect theory value stocks should earn
lower (higher) returns during bubble periods compared to
non-bubble periods. Therefore I do the same portfolio sort-
ing exercise comparing the date-stamped bubble periods to
the non-bubble periods. Table 5 presents the results of this
test.
The results for non-bubble periods indicate no large
changes of the returns to the low high TK strategy. The
first decile still has the highest average excess return and the
tenth the lowest average excess return. Returns in the first
decile are higher, while the magnitude does not change in
the tenth decile. Overall, the low-high TK portfolio earns less
compared to the test using the full sample. During bubble
periods the returns on the same portfolio are on average
more than a percent higher. This is in accordance with my
main hypothesis. However, most of the decile portfolio are
not significantly different from zero anymore. The increase
in returns mainly comes from decile one: while returns in
decile ten are almost on the same level, returns in decile one
increase compared to non-bubble periods. This could indi-
cate that some investors during bubble periods only invest in
stock with high prospect theory value, causing low prospect
theory value stocks to become relatively undervalued and
earn higher returns. Generally the returns on the lower half
of TK decile portfolios are higher during bubble periods. In
order to confirm the results from the portfolio sorts, I first
conduct robustness checks employing different specifications
related to the construction of the prospect theory value. Ta-
ble 6 presents the returns on the low-high TK portfolio for
these tests, for both bubble and non-bubble periods. First,
the construction window of the return distributions used
for the computation of prospect theory values changes from
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Table 4: Portfolio sorts on TK.
The table reports the average monthly excess return of portfolios formed on the prospect theory value. Stocks are assigned to deciles based on their TK value
each month, ranging from low TK (decile one) to high TK (decile ten). The sample starts in January 1983 and ends in December 2017. The numbers in












Low-high TK 0.0148 (5.97)
N 420
Table 5: Portfolio sorts during bubbles.
The table reports the average monthly excess return of portfolios formed on the prospect theory value. Stocks are assigned to deciles based on their TK
value each month, ranging from low TK (decile one) to high TK (decile ten). Bubble periods were date-stamped following PSY (2015). The sample starts in
January 1983 and ends in December 2017.
Decile Excess return
Non-Bubble Bubble
1 0.0168 (4.50) 0.0268 (3.53)
2 0.0129 (4.18) 0.0181 (2.89)
3 0.0114 (4.13) 0.0155 (2.97)
4 0.095 (3.79) 0.0110 (2.15)
5 0.0094 (3.93) 0.0117 (2.29)
6 0.0077 (3.40) 0.0089 (1.91)
7 0.0074 (3.36) 0.0076 (1.78)
8 0.0065 (3.24) 0.0044 (1.29)
9 0.0062 (3.29) 0.0041 (1.22)
10 0.0039 (2.02) 0.0021 (0.46)
Low-high TK 0.0130 (4.73) 0.0247 (4.43)
N 355 65
the benchmark of 60 months to 48 and 36 months. For
bubble periods I expect lower returns to the low-high TK
the longer the construction window, because longer equal
weighted return distributions cannot capture the explosive
nature of prices. During non-bubble periods the returns to
the low-high TK portfolio are slightly higher compared to
the construction window of 60 months and are still highly
significant. Like for the benchmark case, the returns on the
portfolio are higher during bubbles. Taking the results from
Table 5 into consideration, the relationship between longer
construction windows and lower returns on the low-high
TK portfolio during bubbles seems to hold as predicted. The
second technical robustness check for the computation of the
prospect theory values deals with the returns used. Instead
of excess returns over the market, I now use returns in excess
over the risk-free rate and raw returns. Using returns in ex-
cess of the risk-free rate leads to a similar decrease in returns
on the low-high TK portfolio as using raw returns. The im-
pact of different specifications of returns is generally small.
Dividing the sample into two sub-periods generates more in-
teresting results. Since the bubble periods are already a sub
periods, it is not reasonable to analyse them together with
non-bubble periods for this test. The returns on the portfolio
are lower for the period before the new millennium. In both
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Table 6: Robustness tests (Based on Barberis et al., 2016, p.3088).
The table reports the average returns of a low-high prospect theory value portfolio, formed each month by going long (short) in stocks in the lowest (highest)
TK decile. In the panel construction window the TK values are computed with different window sizes for the return distributions. The panel returns tests the
robustness for raw returns and returns in excess of the risk-free rate. Time period splits the sample into two sub periods. In the last panel, I exclude stocks
that fall under 5 Dollars in the month before the computation of TK values.
Low-high TK
Non-Bubble Bubble
Construction window 48 months 0.0117 (4.26) 0.0250 (4.44)
36 months 0.0112 (4.07) 0.0255 (4.57)
Returns Raw returns 0.0131 (4.11) 0.0258 (4.12)
Returns in excess of the risk-free rate 0.0133 (4.20) 0.0260 (4.13)
Time periods 1983-2000 0.0103 (2.92)
2001-2017 0.0150 (3.74)
Exclude low price stock Price >= 5$ 0.0109 (6.43) 0.0153 (3.17)
periods, the returns are lower than the average in Table 4 be-
cause I excluded bubble periods for this robustness test. The
next robustness test shows that low price stocks could be part
of the explanation for the return on the portfolio. The mag-
nitude of returns drops after excluding stocks that fall below
a price of five dollars in the months before computation of
the prospect theory value. Low priced stocks tend to be more
illiquid and less subject to the forces to arbitrage. They are
also more risky and could have a more skewed distribution.
Both of these characteristics attract investors with prospect
theory preferences; therefore low price stocks should have
higher prospect theory values. Individual investors in gen-
eral seem to prefer lotter like stocks. Kumar (2009) analyses
the propensity to gamble that different types of investors
exhibit. He also finds that investors consider a stock a lottery
especially if it has a low price. In summary, the exclusion of
low price stocks should have a negative effect on the returns
of the low-high TK portfolio. Since the returns on the port-
folio are still high and significant after excluding low price
stocks, prospect theory preferences seem to influence prices
in general and not only for a small part of the stock market.
All robustness tests confirm the initial observation that there
are significant abnormal returns to a low-high TK portfolio
during non-bubble periods. In addition, the returns to the
portfolio are larger during bubbles, but suffer from lower
significance. How do the returns to the portfolio develop
during the tech bubble? Figure 7 illustrates the returns on
the low-high TK portfolio for every month date-stamped as
a bubble, from December 1995 up to September 2000. It is
noticeable that the returns to the portfolio are extreme for
most of the tech bubble.
There is one month in 1997 when they drop below minus
eight percent, while they are especially positive in months
from 1998 onwards. This fits earlier results and the magni-
tude of returns seems to coincide with the progress of the
bubble itself, which hits its highest levels in the course of
199820. In the analysis for the portfolio sorts during bubbles
in Table 5, I concluded that the returns on the low-high TK
portfolio seem to be driven mainly by the positive returns of
the lower TK deciles. These returns also seem to be highly
volatile. The high average returns seem to come from fewer
extreme values rather than a constant trend. Also the low
significance in the high TK deciles could be a problem for
the implementation of the strategy during bubbles. Portfo-
lio sorts are not appropriate to test a relationship between
prospect theory value and returns. This leads up to the ques-
tion whether the prospect theory value of a stock in fact has
predictive power for returns in the cross section.
6.4. Prospect theory and stock returns in the cross section
In this section, I test my two predictions using the Fama-
MacBeth approach. They develop a method for testing the
relationship between risk and return using three steps. In
the first step, they run a time-series regression to obtain beta
coefficient estimates. They then use these estimates to a run
cross-sectional regression each month. The coefficients and
standard errors are then obtained as the time-series average.
This approach is frequently applied in asset pricing research.
For my analysis only the last two steps are necessary, since I
am not trying to measure the relationship between return and
risk and therefore do not need market beta-regression coeffi-
cients. The Fama-MacBeth approach is very useful, because
it allows capturing the cross-sectional variation of factors. I
can therefore test my predictions while controlling for vari-
ables known to explain returns. Starting in January 1983 and
ending in December 2017, I run a regression of the prospect
theory value TK and my control variables mentioned in Ta-
ble 2 on the percentage return in that month. The coefficients
20See Figure 5, where the BSADF test statistic reaches its highest level in
1998.
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Figure 7: The low-high TK portfolio during bubbles.
The figure shows the returns of a low-high prospect theory value portfolio, formed each month by going long (short) in stocks in the lowest (highest) TK
decile. The sample runs from 1995m12 up to 2000m9, which falls into bubble periods detected applying a method by Phillips et al. (2015b). The returns are
monthly percentage returns.
and standard errors reported are the time-series average of
these monthly regressions. Panel A of Table 7 reports the re-
sults of this exercise for the months not stamped as a bubble
using the method by Phillips et al. (2015a), while Panel B re-
ports the results for the months stamped as a bubble period
using the same method. In each panel, I run the regressions
with five different specifications. Model (1) is the first test
of my predictions using only TK as an independent variable.
Model (2) brings in controls for market beta, size, book-to-
market ratio, momentum effect and illiquidity. Model (3)
and Model (4) include the control for short term reversal,
rev, and for long term reversal, ltrev, together with the max-
imum and minimum daily return variable, respectively. I do
this to highlight the effect especially rev has on the predictive
power of TK. Model (5) includes the control for skewness of
past returns. The results in Panel A support the original pre-
diction by Barberis et al. (2016). The coefficient on TK is
negative, indicating that an increase in TK measured at the
beginning of the month leads to a decrease in returns. This
effect is not only sizeable, but also economically significant.
After including the controls for size, beta, the book-to-market
ratio and the momentum effect the coefficient on TK remains
significant and loses only little in magnitude. I also find that
including the control for the short term reversal effect, Rev,
has a strong impact on the magnitude and significance of TK.
Comparing the coefficients of TK in Model (2) and Model
(3) shows that the introduction of rev leads to a decrease
in magnitude with the t-statistic shrinking. Why should the
predictive power of TK for returns be affected most by the
return in month t-1? Barberis et al. (2016) argue that in-
vestors get the most recent monthly return from a different
source than returns that are further in the past. If this is cor-
rect, investors might attribute the previous month’s return
more weight than the other returns in the distribution. In
that case, a high return in the previous month would over-
shadow possible low returns in the past and investors would
be incentivised to buy the stock, causing it to become over-
valued and earn low returns. This would also be an alterna-
tive explanation of the short term reversal effect. The most
negative daily return in month t-1 has a similar and strong
negative effect on subsequent returns. The strong effect of
the control variable rev could lead to the conclusion that TK’s
predictive power is due to reversal, but Barberis et al. (2016)
find that leaving out month t-1 in the construction of TK has
no large impact. Skewness should influence the results to
some degree, because probability weighting favours extreme
outcomes with low probability. Therefore a skewed distribu-
tion with a heavy weigh on the right tail should be preferred
by investors with prospect theory preferences. As expected
the inclusion of the skewness control in model (5) leads to
a slight decrease of the significance on TK. I now turn to the
results for the Fama-MacBeth regressions during bubbles in
panel B. This is the test of my main prediction that high (low)
prospect theory values stocks earn lower (higher) returns in
bubble periods compared to non-bubble periods. The results
suggest that, in the cross-section, the prospect theory value
does not have more predictive power for returns during bub-
bles. The significance of TK is very similar to non-bubble
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Table 7: Fama-MacBeth regressions (Based on Barberis et al., 2016, p.3090).
The Table shows the results of the Fama-MacBeth approach. In each cross-sectional regression, percentage return is the dependent variable. TK is a stock’s
prospect theory value, measured at the beginning of the month using a distribution consisting of 60 monthly returns (see equation (7)). Beta is a stock’s
market beta, computed with the returns of 100 portfolios formed on size and pre-beta in June of each year, following Fama and French (1992). Size is the log
equity market value at month t-1; the product of common shares outstanding in December of year t-1 and monthly stock price. Bm is the log book-to-market
ratio calculated as the difference of the log book value and the log equity market value in December of year t-1. Book value is computed following Daniel and
Titman (2006). Mom is a stock’s cumulative return from month t-12 until t-1. Illiq is the illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002), scaled by 105. Rev is a stock’s
return in month t-1. Ltrev is a stock’s cumulative return from month t-60 until t-13. Max is the highest daily return in month t-1, while Min is the negative
of the lowest daily return. Skew is the sample skewness of monthly returns over the past five years. TK, Rev, Mom, Max and Min are scaled by factor 100.
The entire sample starts in January 1983 and ends in December 2017. Panel A shows the results of the Fama-MacBeth regressions for the months (N=355)
not stamped as a bubble using a method by Phillips et al. (2015a), while Panel B shows the results for months (N=65) stamped as a bubble using the same
method. The numbers in brackets show the t-statistics.
Panel A. Non-Bubble B. Bubble
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TK -0.121*** -0.082*** -0.057** -0.080*** -0.092*** -0.251*** -0.226*** -0.192*** -0.190** -0.243**
(-4.68) (-4.49) (-3.31) (-3.68) (-3.45) (-4.67) (-5.51) (-4.77) (-3.36) (-2.94)
Beta 0.247 0.306 0.516* 0.411 0.675 0.763 0.758 0.573
(0.95) (1.20) (2.15) (1.58) (1.24) (1.46) (1.90) (1.45)
Size -0.115*** -0.113*** -0.134*** -0.116*** -0.126 -0.113 -0.128 -0.073
(-4.44) (-4.39) (-4.81) (-4.07) (-1.25) (-1.15) (-1.37) (-0.76)
Bm 0.189*** 0.204*** 0.170*** 0.160*** 0.194 0.208 0.170 0.169
(3.83) (4.17) (3.99) (3.60) (1.17) (1.28) (1.44) (1.50)
Mom 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.005
(1.42) (0.64) (1.04) (0.57) (1.82) (1.58) (1.68) (1.05)
Illiq 0.226*** 0.232** 0.339*** 0.344*** 0.217 0.254 0.279 0.264
(2.85) (2.95) (4.09) (3.33) (1.34) (1.57) (1.57) (1.32)
Rev -0.049*** -0.056*** -0.058*** -0.054*** -0.066*** -0.073***
(-13.90) (-14.17) (-12.62) (-5.84) (-6.60) (-6.38)
Ltrev -0.075 -0.071 -0.049 0.128
(-1.01) (-0.84) (-0.23) (0.49)
Max 0.007 0.015** 0.017 0.016
(1.94) (2.90) (1.48) (1.12)
Min -0.052*** -0.053*** -0.045** -0.049**




squared 0.015 0.044 0.050 0.057 0.062 0.012 0.049 0.056 0.065 0.073
t-statistics in parentheses *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
periods when not controlling for other return predictors in
model (1). In some models it is actually greater than during
non-bubble periods, but for the most sophisticated specifi-
cation TK exhibits slightly weaker predictive power for re-
turns. This leads to the conclusion that the predictive power
of TK is roughly equal during bubble and non-bubble periods.
There is no strong evidence that my prediction holds on av-
erage. Another interesting finding is that the coefficients of
TK are greater in magnitude during bubbles. But comparing
the size of coefficients between the two different sub sam-
ples is not a statistical test, even if the independent variables
are standardized. In general it is important to note that a
precise interpretation of the predictive power of variables in
a Fama-MacBeth regression is only valid under the assump-
tion of linear relationship. In my case the variables are scaled
differently so the interpretation has to be restricted to the t-
statistics. Nonetheless I can compare the effects of the same
variables between the different panels. Bubble periods are
extreme market periods characterised by overvaluation, so
the predictive power for some variables should be expected
to change. While the book-to-market ratio, for example, has
significant positive predictive power for returns during non-
bubble periods in panel A, it has no power in panel B. The
book-to-market ratio is a measurement of the valuation of a
firm’s assets. A higher book-to-market ratio signals underval-
uation. During non-bubble periods an undervaluation should
lead to a future increase in prices and higher returns, which
is suggested by panel A. The book-to-market ratio could lose
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its predictive power for returns during bubbles, because on
average it could be more difficult for investors to determine
the fundamental value of stocks. Just like in panel A, the
short term reversal still seems to play a role during bubbles.
Investors continue to buy stocks that performed well in the
last month, causing them to be overvalued and earn low re-
turns. Although the control for the momentum effect remains
to have no significant influence on returns, it seems to be
somewhat more robust. These results make intuitive sense
for the market conditions during bubbles, where investors
are searching for the best stocks to profit from, but it also de-
scribes the buying behaviour during non-bubble periods. It
is important to notice that the predictive power of all control
variables is weaker during bubble periods. Given this fact,
the predictive power of TK seems rather high. Maybe the
mispricing during bubbles makes it harder for any variables
to predict returns consistently. For TK it seems that both stan-
dard errors and coefficients are larger on average. Taking the
results from the portfolio sort and Figure 7 into account, the
relationship between TK and returns might be stronger dur-
ing bubbles, but only for a smaller set of stocks or particular
time and not on average. This is entirely speculative though.
In summary, I do not find support for the prediction that high
prospect theory value stocks earn lower returns during bub-
bles, but can confirm the original prediction of its general
effect. I the next section, I try to answer part of the ques-
tion which stocks are favoured by prospect theory, namely if
the limits to arbitrage have an impact on TK’s relationship
with returns. This could also shed some light on whether the
limits to arbitrage of a stock have more influence on prices
during bubbles.
6.5. Prospect theory value, limits to arbitrage and individual
investors
Generally, stocks with high limits to arbitrage tend to be
owned by less sophisticated investors. Since it is more costly
for arbitrageurs to employ strategies that correct the mispric-
ing, the prices of these kinds of stocks should be affected by
the behaviour of individual investors to a greater extent. The
prospect theory value is assumed to be a reflection of individ-
ual investor’s behaviour. Therefore the relationship between
high TK values and low returns should be stronger for stocks
exhibiting higher limits to arbitrage. The limits to arbitrage
are hard to measure, but in section 4.1.3, I presented several
approximations. To test whether the effect of TK depends
on the proxies, a Fama-MacBeth regression with interaction
terms is employed. Each regression includes TK, the pre-
vious control variables and adds an interaction term of TK
with the proxy for limits to arbitrage. The first proxy for the
limits to arbitrage is Mashruwala et al. (2006) arbrisk vari-
able. It captures the idiosyncratic volatility of a stock’s past
returns. Arbitrage often requires being able to hedge against
contrary outcomes. The basic idea for the arbrisk variable
is that an arbitrageur can only find substitutes for hedging
of the risk explained by the standard market model. She is
then exposed to the risk that she cannot hedge, the excess
volatility from her model. The variance of residuals of a stan-
dard market model regression, or of models with more fac-
tors, therefore is a proxy for arbitrage risk. Arbrisk therefore
is the residual variance from a standard market model re-
gression of a stock’s return on the market return from month
t-36 to month t-1. Although calculating idiosyncratic volatil-
ity with daily returns would probably be more accurate, I
do not have the resources to execute the required number
of regressions in a large dataset. The second proxy for lim-
its to arbitrage is the dollar trading volume, an indicator for
transaction costs. Stoll (2000) finds that the ask-bid price
spread is negatively related to measures of trading activity,
such as the average daily dollar trading volume. Theoreti-
cally there should be fewer frictions when implementing ar-
bitrage strategies for stock with high trading volume. Fol-
lowing Mashruwala et al. (2006), the measure of transaction
costs tvol is the average daily dollar trading over the past
year. Size is also an approximation of transaction costs and
the limits to arbitrage, since stocks with high market capital-
ization should be easier to loan or short. The last proxy for
the limits to arbitrage is the illiquidity measure of Amihud
(2002), which is the ratio of absolute daily stock return to
trading volume. It measures the marginal impact of one dol-
lar trading volume on prices. More illiquid stock should be
more difficult to incorporate into arbitrage. Table 8 presents
the results of the regression using the interaction terms of
TK with the proxies for limits to arbitrage. For non-bubble
periods, the results confirm the prediction that stocks which
are more likely to have higher limits to arbitrage also exhibit
a stronger predictive power of TK for returns. The interac-
tion terms all show the expected signs on coefficients. The
interaction terms with the measures for arbitrage risk and
illiquidity both have significant negative effect on returns,
because they measure frictions for arbitrage strategies. The
terms with the measures for dollar trading volume and size
have a significant positive effect, because they make it eas-
ier for arbitrageurs to trade against mispricing introduced by
individual investors. During bubbles periods there seems to
be no reinforcing effect of the limits to arbitrage to the effect
of TK. The interaction terms with arbitrage risk, trading vol-
ume, size and illiquidity are not significant anymore. These
don’t seem to be limits to arbitrage influencing the relation-
ship between prospect theory and returns. Are the limits to
arbitrage even rising during bubbles? The arbitrage risk is
a highly significant during non-bubble periods, but does this
limit to arbitrage rise during bubble periods? I test for dif-
ference between means for bubble and non-bubble periods.
Indeed I find that the arbitrage risk is significantly higher dur-
ing bubble periods. This suggests that although the limits to
arbitrage are rising, they might not affect the relationship
between prospect theory and returns. Of course this is just a
narrow view of a much broader problem in research. There
are many other limits to arbitrage that would need to be con-
sidered. Instead of directly measurable limits to arbitrage,
there are also models explaining mispricing by investor be-
haviour. In the model of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003)
arbitrage is delayed, because arbitrageurs try to profit from
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Table 8: Prospect theory value and proxies for limits to arbitrage (Based on Barberis et al., 2016, p. 3096).
The table reports the result of Fama-MacBeth regressions with the independent variable percentage return. The entire table with all control variables can be
found in Appendix E. Arbrisk is the residual variance from a standard market model regression on market returns from month t-36 to t-1. Tvol is the average
daily dollar trading value over year t-1. Size is the log equity market value at month t-1; the product of common shares outstanding in December of year t-1
and monthly stock price. Illiq is the illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002), scaled by 105. TK is scaled by 100. Panel A shows the results of the Fama-MacBeth
regressions for the months (N=355) not stamped as a bubble using a method by Phillips et al. (2015a), while Panel B shows the results for months (N=65)
stamped as a bubble using the same method. The numbers in brackets show the t-statistics.
Panel A. Non-Bubble B. Bubble
(1) Arbrisk (2) Tvol (3) Size (4) Illiq (1) Arbrisk (2) Tvol (3) Size (4) Illiq
TK 0.140*** -0.310*** -0.213*** -0.068** 0.084 -0.169 -0.195 -0.184**









t-statistics in parentheses *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
the bubble. Once the majority of arbitrageurs enter in a sell-
ing effort, the initial mispricing is corrected as the bubble
collapses. In other words, arbitrageurs could knowingly ig-
nore the mispricing and would not necessarily care about the
measurable limits to arbitrage during bubbles. While delayed
arbitrage is a possible cause for mispricing and bubbles, it
is hard to test empirically. Only investor level data shines
some light on the issue. For example, Griffin et al. (2011)
find that institutional investors i.e. arbitrageurs were more
heavily invested in technology stocks during the tech bub-
ble than individual investors. It is also a coordinated selling
effort of institutions in mid-March of 2000 that drives the
collapse of the bubble and not individual investors. Individ-
ual investors should have more influence on prices during
bubbles, because arbitrageurs have more interest in riding
it than correcting the mispricing. Other proposition to why
the tech bubble built up is the increase number of individual
investors. Brennan, for example, argues for an increase in
individual investors during the 1990s due to changes in pen-
sion plan policy, from benefit pension plans to contribution
plans. Benefit pension plans were managed by the employer
and protected against failure, while contribution plans put
the responsibility for the investment in the hands of the em-
ployee. Contribution plans also began to lean more towards
equity investments. In addition, households in the 1990s fol-
lowed the same trend, increasing the share of equities in their
portfolio from 13.2% in 1990 to 32.5% in 199921. Although
the discussion on limits to arbitrage and individual investors
during bubbles shows that overall individual investor’s pref-
erences should be able to manifest themselves to a greater
degree, this seems to have no impact on the prospect theory
variable. How does the mechanism of the prospect theory
value work at a more fundamental level? Maybe the mech-
anism offers some insights on the issue. In the next section,
I therefore analyse the effect of the components of prospect
theory on returns individually.
6.6. On the relevance of prospect theory components
In order to better understand what drives the results, I
test the importance of the three components of prospect the-
ory reflected in the equations of the value function and the
probability weighting function. Each of the components re-
flects certain behavioural patterns individuals exhibited in
experiments. By analysing the components it could be pos-
sible to infer which of these patterns is especially important
for the predictive power of the prospect theory value. Since
I focus on the comparison of bubble and non-bubble peri-
ods, the following analysis can also show whether the rel-
ative importance of the components undergoes significant
changes through time. Hence the analysis could give insights
into the evolution of behavioural patterns of investors, de-
21See Brennan, 2004, p.6.
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pending on the situation they are facing in the stock mar-
kets. The empirical test is based on the Fama-MacBeth ap-
proach used in Table 7. Specifically it is Model 5 of Ta-
ble 7, which includes all control variables. But instead of
using all the parameters provided by Tversky and Kahne-
mann (1992) to construct the variable TK, parameters are
chosen such that only one specific component of prospect the-
ory is active. This means that either probability weighting,
loss aversion or diminishing sensitivity is active. In order to
study the predictive power of TK constructed with a focus
on probability weighting, the parameters for loss aversion
and diminishing sensitivity are set to one. So TK in the col-
umn labelled PW (probability weighting) is computed with
the parameters λ=1;α=1;γ=0.61;δ=0.69 . The same ra-
tionale applies to the other columns in Table 7. TK in the
column labelled LA (loss aversion) corresponds to applying
the parameters λ=2.25;α=1;γ=1;δ=1 and TK in the col-
umn labelled DS (diminishing sensitivity) to the parameters
λ=1;α=0.88;γ=1;δ=1. In contrast to Table 5, the indepen-
dent variables in Table 7 are normalized to have a mean of
zero and a standard deviation of one. Barberis et al. (2016)
present a very similar analysis, but also look at interactions
of the three components. The results I get for this exten-
sion do not provide much additional information. Therefore
I don’t present them here and avoid making the table more
complex than needed, especially since there are two sections
of results comparing bubble to non-bubble periods. The first
three columns in Table 9 show the result for non-bubble peri-
ods. It seems that loss aversion by itself explains a great deal
of the effect of prospect theory. Probability weighting and
diminishing sensitivity on the other hand become insignif-
icant predictors after including all control variables. Espe-
cially the control for the long term reversal has a great im-
pact on their t statistics and on the sign of the coefficients.
Before including ltrev, probability weighting is actually a sig-
nificant predictor of returns on its own, with a negative sign
on the coefficient. Maybe the turning of the sign is due to
the high correlation between ltrev and TK constructed with
probability weighting and diminishing sensitivity. However,
I do not find any evidence for collinearity after testing for the
VIF measure. Taking all this into account, I cautiously con-
clude that the positive sign on the coefficients should not be
assigned too much weight, since they are negative for any
model excluding ltrev. In general probability weighting by
itself is a more significant predictor of returns than dimin-
ishing sensitivity. This suggests that the skewness of a re-
turn distribution should also be somewhat attractive to in-
vestors with prospect theory preferences. If this is true, then
the combination of probability weighting and loss aversion
in the TK variable should result in the most predictive power
for returns. I indeed find that this TK variable has the most
predictive power for returns, even higher than the original
specification. The respective results are located in Appendix
F. During bubbles the relative importance of the prospect the-
ory components does not seem to change. Loss aversion re-
mains to be the most reliable predictor of returns by itself.
Overall, the effects are less significant, which reflects the re-
sult form Table 7 to some extent. If loss aversion is impor-
tant during both bubble and non-bubble periods, what does
this mean for the return distribution investors acting accord-
ing to prospect theory prefer? Under loss aversion a loss has
a greater weight than a gain of similar size. Therefore in-
vestors should prefer return distributions with low standard
deviation. In summary then, the optimal distribution of re-
turns should first and foremost have low standard deviation
and combine this with some skewness. These results are just
guesses, as a comparison of t statistics across the columns is
no conclusive test of the matter. Since loss aversion seems to
play such a big role, it is possible that the effect on returns is
not unique to prospect theory. After all, expected utility also
has a concave value function, indicating that individuals are
loss averse. With this alternative setup, the prediction would
be that high expected utility stocks earn low subsequent re-
turns. In the next section I test this conjecture using the ex-
pected power utility formula from Barberis et al. (2016).
6.7. Prospect theory versus expected utility
The test for expected utility will consist of the Fama-
MacBeth regressions in Table 7, but this time I compare the
effect of the TK variable with the effect of the variable EU,






1−θ /1− θ , (26)
where the parameter theta is initially set at 5, indicating a
high degree of loss aversion. EU is constructed using the
same return distributions as the TK variable, where each re-
turn is weighted with equal probability. Of course it is stated
in terms of final wealth; therefore it is 1+ ri instead of just
ri . This means that the loss aversion has the most impact
in the region near-1. There, the curve for expected utility is
especially steep. In addition meaning of subscripts m and n
is in accordance with equation (6), m is the lowest ranked
return and n is the highest ranked return in the distribution.
Table 10 presents the results of this exercise. Similar to the
prospect theory value, I find a negative realationship between
the expected utility and returns. This would mean that the
effect observed in Table 7 is not unique to prospect theory. A
possible cause for this has been discussed earlier. Both mod-
els for decision making under risk share the incorporation of
loss aversion. Maybe loss aversion is the dominating force
behind the results and it does not matter whether returns
are measured over final wealth or gains and losses. This re-
sult also would stand in contra to Barberis et al. (2016) that
find no relationship between returns an expected utility. In
fact, the regressions leading up to Table 7 show that the re-
lationship between expected utility and returns is spurious.
In the model that only tests expected utility and returns, the
relationship is positive. This positive relationship holds un-
til the control for the long term reversal is included. Again
one could cautiously conclude that the elevated correlation
between EU and ltrev has a confounding impact on the re-
gression. Therefore the interpretation of the result form Ta-
ble 10 is speculative. To quickly test what constitutes a high
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Table 9: Relative importance of prospect theory components (Based on Barberis et al., 2016, p.3101).
The table presents the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions on the monthly percentage return as dependent variable. The independent control variables are
the same as in Table 7, but normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. In each column, TK is computed with only one active parameter for
probability weighting (PW), loss aversion (LA) and diminishing sensitivity. The sample runs from January 1983 until December 2017, but is split into bubble
(N=355) and non-bubble (N=65) periods. T-statistics are in parentheses.
Non-Bubble Bubble
PW LA DS PW LA DS
TK 0.071 -0.336*** 0.164 0.179 -0.813** 0.091
(1.17) (-3.34) (0.52) (1.00) (-2.76) (0.11)
Beta 0.202* 0.128 0.204* 0.337* 0.180 0.351*
(2.49) (1.89) (2.55) (2.33) (1.76) (2.33)
Size -0.320*** -0.225*** -0.341*** -0.320 -0.103 -0.375*
(-5.64) (-3.82) (-5.99) (-1.79) (-0.56) (-2.02)
Bm 0.110*** 0.135*** 0.113** 0.031 0.124 0.042
(3.04) (3.83) (3.14) (0.27) (1.33) (0.37)
Mom -0.040 0.077 -0.089 -0.012 0.286 0.033
(-0.53) (1.28) (-0.66) (-0.07) (1.68) (0.08)
Illiq 0.209*** 0.202*** 0.210*** 0.189 0.160 0.193
(4.23) (4.01) (4.22) (1.80) (1.45) (1.86)
Rev -0.709*** -0.688*** -0.727*** -0.872** -0.806** -0.861**
(-13.36) (-14.34) (-12.46) (-7.00) (-6.78) (-4.59)
Ltrev -0.241*** -0.006 -0.342 -0.509** -0.106 -0.457
(-3.48) (-0.09) (-1.27) (-2.86) (0.49) (-0.65)
Max 0.518* 0.364 0.531* 1.252 0.589 1.360
(2.13) (1.69) (2.21) (1.78) (1.03) (1.87)
Min -0.225*** -0.275*** -0.224*** -0.131 -0.235** -0.135
(-6.11) (-8.73) (-6.11) (-1.77) (-4.07) (-1.79)
t-statistics in parentheses *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
expected utility stock, I sort stocks into deciles each month
and calculate the expected value for the different control vari-
ables. Then I analyse the time series average of these statis-
tics, with a special focus on the return measures. The aver-
age returns in the high expected utility decile are lower than
those of the first decile. In addition, the long term rever-
sal is decreasing in the expected utility decile. Therefore I
would expect a positive relationship between expected util-
ity if anything, as the counterpart to the effect of prospect
theory value. I don’t present the resulting table here, because
the point was to quickly back test which relationship between
expected utility and returns could make sense. However, the
corresponding table can be found in Appendix G. In any case,
the prospect theory has higher predictive power over returns
and the estimation process is more robust. In summary, I do
not find definitive proof that expected utility has a similar ef-
fect on returns like prospect theory. Generally, the prospect
theory value seems to reflect investor behaviour in the U.S.
stock markets more accurately. Then, the following question
arises from these results: Which return characteristics do in-
vestors with prospect theory preferences like the most? Pre-
vious results suggest that low standard deviation and skew-
ness should be preferred. In order to get a broader picture
regarding the return characteristics, the next section presents
the results of a decile sort on prospect theory value, similar
to the one for expected utility.
6.8. Decile sorts on prospect theory value
Each month I sort stocks into deciles based on their
prospect theory value. For each decile the average value
for several of the control variables is computed. The sam-
ple periods starts in January 1983 and ends in December
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Table 10: Prospect theory versus expected utility.
The Table reports the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions with percentage returns as the dependent variable. The control variables are the same as in Table 7.
EU is a stock’s expected utility based on its past return distribution of 60 months. The sample runs from January 1983 until December 2017, but is split into
bubble (N=355) and non-bubble (N=65) periods. T-statistics are in parentheses.
Non-Bubble Bubble





Beta 0.411 0.543* 0.573 0.834*
(1.58) (2.23) (1.45) (2.04)
Size -0.116*** -0.119*** -0.073 -0.082
(-4.07) (-4.42) (-0.76) (-1.00)
Bm 0.160*** 0.157*** 0.169 0.127
(3.60) (3.71) (1.50) (1.09)
Mom -0.001 -0.003 0.005 -0.004
(-0.57) (1.31) (1.05) (-0.95)
Illiq 0.344*** 0.323*** 0.264 0.249
(3.33) (3.95) (1.32) (1.38)
Rev -0.058*** -0.060*** -0.073*** -0.075***
(-12.62) (-13.72) (-6.38) (-7.76)
Ltrev -0.071 -0.443*** 0.128 -0.950***
(-0.84) (-5.04) (0.49) (-4.35)
Max 0.015** 0.007 0.016 0.012
(2.90) (1.84) (1.12) (1.21)
Min -0.053*** -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.039**
(-6.76) (-8.08) (-3.74) (-3.31)
Skew 0.117* -0.005 0.187 -0.027
(2.56) (-0.18) (1.56) (0.44)
t-statistics in parentheses *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
2017. The reported values are the averages of the time se-
ries consisting of the average value per variable and month.
In addition to sourcing from the control variables introduced
earlier, the standard deviation is also included. Sd is com-
puted as the standard deviation of monthly returns over
the past three years. Including sd makes it possible to test
whether loss aversion indeed plays a role when individual
investors pick stocks. Table 11 presents the results of this
exercise. First, prospect theory values are negative on aver-
age, even in the high TK decile. The prospect theory value
of a stock is also increasing in size and decreasing in the
book-to-market ratio. This is a first indication that large and
less volatile stocks are preferred by individual investors with
prospect theory preferences. In accordance with this conjec-
ture, the measure for illiquidity is decreases monotonically
form decile one to decile ten. The regressions from Table 7
have shown that past return measures have a large impact
on the predictive power of the prospect theory value. Ta-
ble 11 makes the same point in a different way. Rev and
ltrev increase monotonically from decile one through decile
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Table 11: Prospect theory value portfolios (Based on Barberis et al., 2016, p.3100).
The Table reports the time series average of the monthly mean statistic of variables for deciles formed on TK. The description of variables can be found in
Table 2. Sd is the standard deviation of monthly returns over the past five years. The sample starts in January 1983 and ends in December 2017.
Deciles TK Beta Size Bm Rev Illiq Ltrev Skew Sd
1 -0.138 1.200 4.317 -0.285 -0.007 0.567 -0.403 0.166 0.184
2 -0.107 1.159 5.313 -0.445 0.003 0.211 0.126 -0.044 0.153
3 -0.093 1.120 5.789 -0.519 0.006 0.127 0.283 -0.166 0.136
4 -0.084 1.089 5.984 -0.562 0.008 0.093 0.384 -0.183 0.124
5 -0.076 1.055 6.107 -0.581 0.009 0.068 0.437 -0.145 0.114
6 -0.068 1.029 6.152 -0.589 0.010 0.055 0.468 -0.066 0.105
7 -0.062 1.001 6.218 -0.617 0.012 0.042 0.501 0.045 0.097
8 -0.054 0.986 6.317 -0.625 0.013 0.033 0.553 0.178 0.090
9 -0.046 0.961 6.487 -0.656 0.015 0.023 0.628 0.318 0.084
10 -0.032 0.989 6.772 -0.763 0.023 0.019 0.925 0.646 0.087
Total -0.076 1.060 5.945 -0.564 0.010 0.124 0.390 0.075 0.117
ten. At first sight this could lead to the conclusion that TK
really measures the effects of these reversals. Although these
measures take significant bites out of the predictive power
of TK, its negative relationship with returns remains signifi-
cant. The results from Table 9 suggest that skewness should
be preferred by investors with prospect theory preferences.
As expected, skewness generally increases from decile one to
decile ten. But the relationship is less straightforward than
assumed. Apparently, returns in the first decile are skewed
more than returns up to decile seven. This could be con-
nected to the fact that the standard deviation in the first
decile is at its highest point over all deciles. Returns exhibit-
ing a high standard deviation are more likely to be skewed
as well. The skewness of returns particularly increases from
decile seven on, with the sharpest rise from decile nine to
ten. The standard deviation also increases from decile nine
to ten, while it decrease from decile one to nine. Again, this
could be due to the relationship between skewness and stan-
dard deviation. However, the standard deviation remains
below its average value. Stocks in the high prospect the-
ory value deciles exhibit the characteristics expected earlier.
They have a high return, high skewness and low standard
deviation. Investors with prospect theory preferences should
indeed like high returns combined with a low standard devia-
tion, because they are loss averse. Loss aversion causes these
investors to “feel” losses more heavily than gains, so they tilt
towards low standard deviation. On the other hand investors
with prospect theory preferences like skewness because of
probability weighting. They overweight returns that are less
likely to occur and tend to buy “stock lotteries”; high reward
and low probability. Together with the results from previous
tests, this leads to the conclusion that investors evaluating
stock using prospect theory look for a certain mix of both
worlds. High prospect theory value stocks are those which
optimally combine skewness, volatility and high returns.
7. Conclusion and summary of results
There are several questions related to recent research I try
to address with the analysis in this paper. The first goal was to
test the model by Barberis et al. (2016). The fundamental as-
sumption in this framework is that individual investors eval-
uate stocks based on the prospect theory value of their past
return distributions. Individual investors add stocks with a
high prospect theory value to their portfolio and sell those
with low prospect theory value. Therefore stocks with high
(low) prospect theory value become overvalued (underval-
ued) and earn low (high) subsequent returns. I find support
for this prediction in the cross section of U.S. stock markets
during the period of January 1983 to December 2017. This
extends the evidence of the impact the preferences of indi-
vidual investors have on prices in the stock market. Prospect
theory seems to capture the behaviour and choices of indi-
vidual investors to a certain degree. Based on the formal
model of Barberis et al. (2016), I made the additional pre-
diction that the relationship between prospect theory value
and returns should be more pronounced during bubbles. This
prediction was based on a two-fold argument: that the lim-
its to arbitrage rise during bubbles and the number of in-
dividual investors increases. The limits to arbitrage are as-
sumed to rise, because rational investors delay arbitrage and
arbitrage becomes more costly. The increase in individual
investors on the other hand comes from the attention grab-
bing nature of stocks during bubbles. Testing the prediction
during bubbles is a way to find out whether the predictive
power of the prospect theory value varies through time. It is
also related to the question how investor behaviour changes
depending on the market conditions. In order to test the pre-
diction, I had to define what constitutes a bubble and apply
a method to time stamp the start and collapse of the bubbles.
The BSADF test developed by Phillips et al. (2015a) is tool
for the detection of bubbles, which has been proven to work
in many different markets. It focuses on the nature of the
stochastic pro-cesses underlying the price development. The
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application of this method has led to the conclusion that two
bubbles existed in the price dividend ratio of the S&P 500
during the time period of January 1983 to December 2017.
The first corresponds to the lead up to Black Monday in Oc-
tober and spans from February 1987 to August 1987. The
second coincides with the tech bubble during the late stages
of the past century, ranging from December 1995 to Septem-
ber 2000. The implementation of the BSADF test in the con-
text of the time series of the S&P 500 supports the reliability
of the approach. The time stamping of the start and end of
the detected bubbles seems to be consistent across different
studies, if the underlying time series used is similar. But I
also find some issues for the specification of the test, espe-
cially concerning the necessary assumption of the minimum
bubble duration, where the application of economic intuition
becomes necessary. In the main empirical test I find no sup-
port for the prediction that high prospect theory value stocks
earn lower subsequent returns during bubbles compared to
non-bubble periods. In contrast, the returns to a strategy that
buys stocks with low prospect theory value and sells stock
with high prospect theory value are higher during bubbles.
However both tests suggest that the significance could be a
problem and the relationship between prospect theory value
and returns is, on average, not stronger during bubbles. The
changes in significance are not large enough to justify an ar-
gument for an increase or decrease in the predictive power
of the prospect theory value. The main analysis also sheds
some light on the predictive power of other commonly used
variables in financial research. Variables drawing their power
from a measurement of over- or undervaluation suffer no-
ticeably during bubbles. The same goes for predictors that
are based on past performance, although they mostly remain
significant. The short term reversal especially has shown a
very robust relationship with returns. In light of the find-
ings, the almost constant effect of prospect theory on returns
shows that behavioural explanations of asset prices can offer
valuable insights. Being able to time stamp bubbles in the
stock markets might make it possible to better understand
the forces determining prices. This is an interesting avenue
for future research in asset pricing. The analysis on the ac-
curacy of the limits to arbitrage argument has also proven
insightful. The first and maybe most important question is
how to measure the limits to arbitrage. Most of the research
is focussed on approximations for costs or risks involved with
arbitrage. But they might not be able to explain many risks
that arbitrageurs face in the stock market. The delayed arbi-
trage model by Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) is just one
example for this. By applying several proxies for the limits to
arbitrage I was able to show that stocks with higher limits to
arbitrage are more prone to the effect of the prospect theory
value. Future research in the measurement of limits to arbi-
trage could be helpful, although it is already quite extensive.
Looking into each of the individual components of prospect
theory has shown that loss aversion and probability weight-
ing together predict returns with the highest significance. Be-
cause of loss aversion, investors with prospect theory prefer-
ences like stocks that have a low standard deviation. They
also tend to prefer stocks with high skewness, because low
probability outcomes receive more weight in the return dis-
tribution due to probability weighting. In general, investors
seem to prefer a combination of low standard deviation and
high skewness under prospect theory. There are several open
questions with regards to prospect theory that future research
could address. One important aspect is the definition of gains
and losses. The modelling of gains and losses based on re-
cent expectations is a concept that, with further testing, could
prove valuable to applications of prospect theory. Empirically
testing the reference points of investors could prove difficult
though, since the necessary data has to be available on the
investor level. Further research on the information sources
could provide equally helpful guidelines in this matter. In the
short review under section 2.3.2 several interesting questions
arise. Where do investors get information on stock prices and
returns? How does the presentation form influence the per-
ceived attractiveness of a stock? An overview that connects
the findings of the related research would be very helpful for
the empirical application of prospect theory. It is also possible
to consider other models of individual’s choices under risk, as
the section on expected utility has shown. The assumption
that investors evaluate stocks based on a stock’s past return
distribution could maybe be lifted in such models. It is possi-
ble, that these models have even greater explanatory power
for asset prices. After all, one of the most interesting findings
of my analysis is that behavioural models like prospect the-
ory might be more consistent predictors of stock prices over
time than measures of valuation or risk-return relationships.
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